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Comment 
Just Because It’s Legal Doesn’t Mean You Can Do 
It: The Legality of Employee Eavesdropping and 
Illinois Workplace Recording Policies 
Michael J. Gibson* 
In March 2014, in People v. Clark and People v. Melongo the Illinois 
Supreme Court held unconstitutional a large portion of the Illinois 
Eavesdropping Act (“IEA”), one of the nation’s strictest criminal 
eavesdropping statutes.  However, on December 30, 2014, outgoing 
Governor Pat Quinn signed into law a new eavesdropping statute 
remedying what Clark and Melongo deemed unconstitutional. 
Prior to 2014, under the IEA, if employers caught employees 
recording conversations at work, the employer hardly needed a 
justification for employee discipline or discharge: the employee was 
violating the law.  Thus, Clark, Melongo, and the December changes to 
the IEA raise questions for not only criminal jurisprudence, but also 
employment law; specifically workplace recording policies.  Currently, 
although eavesdropping in Illinois is only illegal if an individual 
surreptitiously records a private conversation, employers may still 
discipline their employees for violating a company recording policy. 
The following Comment addresses the legality of workplace 
recording policies and what effect, if any, Clark, Melongo, and the 
December changes to the IEA will have on such policies.  The Comment 
draws from existing case law as well as examines other state 
eavesdropping statutes and concludes that, notwithstanding the recent 
Illinois Supreme Court decisions and the December changes to the IEA, 
an Illinois employer may still implement a workplace recording policy 
and discipline employees for violations of that policy.  Furthermore, 
when Seventh Circuit federal courts and Illinois state courts review 
such recording policies and discipline for violations, the courts should 
view such actions as legitimate and favorably uphold employer actions.   
 
* B.A. Political Science, University of Vermont, 2013; J.D. Candidate, Loyola University 
Chicago School of Law, 2016.  Many thanks to my family for always believing in me. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The key to good eavesdropping is not getting caught.1 
 
Until 2014, the Illinois Eavesdropping Act (“IEA”) made it illegal for 
an individual to knowingly or intentionally audio record any 
conversation or interaction between two or more people without the 
consent of every party to the conversation.2  In March 2014, the Illinois 
Supreme Court held unconstitutional parts of the IEA in two separate 
decisions.3  In People v. Clark4 and People v. Melongo,5 two unanimous 
decisions determined that the portion of the IEA that required two-party 
consent6 to record a conversation was unconstitutional.7  Clark and 
Melongo had their intended effect, however, and on December 30, 
2014, changes were made to the IEA and a new eavesdropping act was 
signed into law remedying the constitutional flaws raised by the two 
cases.8  While Clark and Melongo involved criminal charges—indeed 
 
1. LEMONY SNICKET, THE BLANK BOOK (A SERIES OF UNFORTUNATE EVENTS) (2004). 
2. Illinois Eavesdropping Act, 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-2 (2012), held unconstitutional in 
People v. Clark, 2014 IL 115776, 6 N.E.3d 154 (Ill. 2014), and People v. Melongo, 2014 IL 
114852, 6 N.E.3d 120 (Ill. 2014). 
3. See Eric M. Johnson, Illinois Supreme Court Strikes Down Eavesdropping Law as Too 
Broad, REUTERS (Mar. 21, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/21/us-usa-court-eaves 
dropping-idUSBREA2K08D20140321 (reporting that the Illinois Supreme Court struck down a 
part of the IEA as unconstitutional because it criminalized recording some innocent behavior); 
Steve Schmadeke, State Supreme Court Strikes Down Eavesdropping Law, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 20, 
2014), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2014-03-20/news/chi-supreme-court-eavesdropping-law 
-20140320_1_illinois-supreme-court-illinois-eavesdropping-act-cook-county-jail (reporting  
Annabel Melongo’s reflections on the time she spent in jail for a violation of the IEA). 
4. People v. Clark, 2014 IL 115776, 6 N.E.3d 154 (Ill. 2014). 
5. People v. Melongo, 2014 IL 114852, 6 N.E.3d 120 (Ill. 2014). 
6. When a jurisdiction has an eavesdropping law that requires the consent of every party to the 
conversation, it is typically referred to as a “two-party consent law” regardless of whether two or 
more people are party to the conversation.  Thus, “two-party” and “all-party” are terms used 
interchangeably to describe a jurisdiction that has an eavesdropping law that requires every party 
to the conversation to consent in order for lawful recording to occur.  Throughout this Comment, 
“two-party consent” is the terminology used for a statute that requires each party to the 
conversation to consent for legally permissible recording to occur.  See infra Part I.A (discussing 
the different jurisdictions’ eavesdropping laws); see also Jesse Harlan Alderman, Police Privacy 
in the iPhone Era?: The Need for Safeguards in State Wiretapping Statutes to Preserve the 
Civilian’s Right to Record Public Police Activity, 9 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 487, 532–45 (2011) 
(touching upon state wiretapping and eavesdropping laws in both one-party and two-party 
contexts).  See generally Carol M. Bast, What’s Bugging You? Inconsistencies and Irrationalities 
of the Law of Eavesdropping, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 837 (1998) (using the term “wiretapping” 
broadly to encompass an extensive discussion and fifty-state analysis of the different types of 
eavesdropping laws). 
7. Clark, 2014 IL 115776, ¶¶ 25–26; Melongo, 2014 IL 114852, ¶¶ 26, 36. 
8. S.B. 1342, 98th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., 2014 Ill. Laws, P.A. 98-1142, § 5; see infra Part 
IV (addressing the changes made to the IEA by Illinois General Assembly and its implications). 
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the IEA is a criminal statute—the effects have indirect civil 
ramifications.  This Comment addresses a civil ramification in the 
employment law context: workplace recording policies. 
Prior to Clark and Melongo, the IEA required two-party consent to 
record a conversation.  Two-party consent requires that each party to a 
conversation be aware of and consent to recording in order for an 
individual to lawfully record the conversation.9  Thus, an Illinois 
employer could quite easily prohibit employees from recording—
whether surreptitiously or openly—conversations in the workplace, and 
justify subsequently disciplining an employee for the recording.10  
Recording at work constituted criminal behavior, and employers did not 
need to justify prohibiting employees from engaging in such conduct.11  
Clark and Melongo beg the question of whether this is still sound 
practice.12  If openly recording a conversation is no longer illegal, does 
that mean an employee can record anything she desires while at work?13  
This Comment examines this question and attempts to navigate through 
the application of workplace recording policies following Clark, 
Melongo, and the December 2014 changes to the IEA. 
Part I of this Comment discusses the different types of eavesdropping 
laws, provides a history of eavesdropping law in Illinois, and explains 
 
9. See text accompanying supra note 6 (describing two-party consent). 
10. See, e.g., De La Cruz v. Ill. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 2012 IL App 111888-U, ¶¶ 1, 15 
(approving the Commission’s decision to discharge an employee for a violation of a workplace 
policy); Williams v. Ill. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 968 N.E.2d 1238, 1241 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012) (holding 
that the Commission’s decision to discharge an employee for a violation of a zero tolerance of 
violence in the workplace policy was not arbitrary, unreasonable, or unrelated to the employee’s 
actions); Younge v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chi., 788 N.E.2d 1153 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (upholding 
the Board’s decision to terminate employees without written warning for violating a drug-free 
school policy). 
11. If the offending employee was at-will, the individual may be fired for any reason.  See, 
e.g., Jacobson v. Knepper & Moga, P.C., 706 N.E.2d 491, 492 (Ill. 1998) (“Generally, an 
employer may fire an employee-at-will for any reason or no reason at all.”); Fellhauer v. City of 
Geneva, 568 N.E.2d 870, 875 (Ill. 1991) (stating that the court generally adheres to the 
proposition that at-will employees may be fired for any reason or no reason except for the limited 
and narrow cause of action for the tort of retaliatory discharge); Barr v. Kelso-Burnett Co., 478 
N.E.2d 1354, 1356 (Ill. 1985) (“The common law doctrine that an employer may discharge an 
employee-at-will for any reason or for no reason is still the law in Illinois . . . .”). 
12. One major Chicago employment law firm has raised questions about potential 
ramifications, posting an article about the issue shortly after the Clark and Melongo decisions.  
See Jacqueline Gharapour Wernz & Lisa McGarrity, Impact on Employers and Schools of Illinois 
Supreme Court’s Rejection of Eavesdropping Law, FRANCZEK RADELET (Mar. 26, 2014), 
http://www.franczek.com/frontcenter-Eavesdropping_Law_Schools_Employers.html. 
13. See infra Part III.A (concluding that an employee may not violate an employer’s 
workplace recording policy notwithstanding the open recording’s legality).  But see infra Part 
IV.A (discussing that, pursuant to the December changes, the surreptitious recording of a private 
conversation is still unlawful under the IEA). 
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employer workplace recording policies.14  The first portion of Part II 
discusses how workplace recording policies have been interpreted, 
including Title VII implications for such policies.15  The second portion 
of Part II examines the facts, holdings, and reasoning by the Illinois 
Supreme Court in Clark and Melongo.16  Part III analyzes the expected 
impact that Clark and Melongo will have on employer recording 
policies in Illinois.17  Part IV.A explains the December changes to the 
IEA and the current status of the law of eavesdropping.18  Then, Part 
IV.B discusses how federal and Illinois courts should react to the 
December changes to the IEA.19  Finally, Part IV.C proposes how the 
IEA interacts with and affects employee recording and employer 
workplace recording policies.20  Ultimately, this Comment concludes 
that although open recording is no longer illegal in Illinois,21 an 
employer may still prohibit its employees from recording conversations 
that occur in the workplace. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A.  The Laws of Eavesdropping 
Nearly every United States jurisdiction prohibits eavesdropping.22  
 
14. See infra Part I. 
15. See infra Part II.A–C. 
16. See infra Part II.D. 
17. See infra Part III.A–B. 
18. See infra Part IV.A. 
19. See infra Part IV.B. 
20. See infra Part IV.C. 
21. See infra Part IV.A. 
22. Vermont is the only jurisdiction that does not have an explicit wiretapping or 
eavesdropping statute.  Bast, supra note 6, at 851; see Carol M. Bast, Conflict of Law and 
Surreptitious Taping of Telephone Conversations, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 147, 150 (2010).  
North Carolina does not have an eavesdropping law; however, the state does have a criminal 
wiretapping law.  See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-155 (2013).  Thirty-five states and the District of 
Columbia have one-party consent eavesdropping laws.  See Alderman, supra note 6, at app.1 
(addressing state eavesdropping and wiretapping statutes current to 2011); Bast, supra note 6, at 
app. A & B (collecting state eavesdropping and wiretapping statutes current to 1999).  Thirteen 
states have two-party consent eavesdropping laws, including the IEA.  See CAL. PENAL CODE § 
632 (2010) (including § 632(d), which states that “[e]xcept as proof in an action or prosecution 
for violation of this section, no evidence obtained as a result of eavesdropping upon or recording 
a confidential communication in violation of this section shall be admissible in any judicial, 
administrative, legislative, or other proceeding,” and which was abrogated by People v. Algire, 
165 Cal. Rptr. 650 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013), reh’g denied and ordered not officially published, 
People v. Algire, 165 Cal. Rptr. 650 at n.2 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014); eavesdropping, however, is still 
illegal and requires two-party consent); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 52-570d, 53a-187–189 (2012); 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1335 (2007); FLA. STAT. §§ 934.01–09 (2001); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
ANN. 5/14-1 to 5/14-2 (West 2014); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. §§ 10-401–08 (2013); 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 99(B)(2) (2010); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 750.539a–39h (2004); 
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The laws that proscribe eavesdropping derive in part from the desire to 
safeguard an individual’s privacy.23  While the Fourth Amendment and 
comparable state constitutional provisions are primarily concerned with 
governmental intrusion, the laws also proscribe eavesdropping 
predicated on privacy concerns.24  Moreover, an explicit right to 
privacy, separate from search-and-seizure provisions, is provided for in 
several state constitutions.25 
 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-213 (2013) (a portion of Montana’s privacy law was recently held 
unconstitutional in State v. Dugan, 303 P.3d 755 (Mont. 2013), reh’g denied, (Mar. 29, 2013); 
however, this did not affect the eavesdropping portion of the law); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 570-
A:1–11 (2003); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 133.721, 165.535–49 (2013); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 5703–04 
(2000); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.73.030 (2010). 
23. Bast, supra note 6, at 839.  Additionally, several state eavesdropping statutes have explicit 
sections on the legislative findings and intent, which gave rise to statutes, citing the right to 
privacy.  See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 630 (2010) (recognizing concerns about devices and 
invasion of privacy “[t]he Legislature by this chapter intends to protect the right of privacy of the 
people of this state.”); FLA. STAT. § 934.01 (2001) (“To safeguard the privacy of innocent 
persons . . . .”). 
24. U.S. CONST. amend. IV: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
For chronological development of privacy and the Fourth Amendment in Supreme Court cases, 
see Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 509–12 (1960) (establishing the standard that 
eavesdropping into conversations intended to be private may implicate the Fourth Amendment); 
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967) (stating that the Fourth Amendment “protects 
individual privacy against certain kinds of governmental intrusion . . . .”); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 
U.S. 583, 589 (1974) (plurality decision) (“The primary object of the Fourth Amendment was 
determined to be the protection of privacy.”). 
25. See ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22 (Right of Privacy: “The right of people to privacy is 
recognized and shall not be infringed.”); ARIZ. CONST. art 2, § 8 (Right to privacy: “No person 
shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law.”); CAL. 
CONST. art. 1, § 1 (Inalienable rights: “All people are by nature free and independent and have 
alienable rights.  Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, 
and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy.”); FLA. 
CONST. art. I, § 23 (Right to privacy: “Every natural person has the right to be let alone and free 
from governmental intrusion into his private life except as otherwise provided herein.”); HAW. 
CONST. art I, § 6 (Right of Privacy: “The right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall not 
be infringed without the showing of a compelling state interest.”); ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 12 (Right 
to Remedy and Justice: “Every person shall find a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries and 
wrongs which he receives to his person, privacy, property or reputation.  He shall obtain justice 
by law, freely, completely, and promptly.”); LA. CONST. art. 1, § 5 (Right to Privacy: “Every 
person shall be secure in his person, property, communications, houses, papers, and effects 
against unreasonable searches, seizures, or invasions of privacy.”); MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10 
(Right of privacy: “The right of individual privacy is essential to the well-being of a free society 
and shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state interest.”); S.C. CONST. art. 
I, § 10 (Search and seizures; invasions of privacy: “The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures and unreasonable 
invasions of privacy shall not be violated . . . .” (emphasis added)); WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 7 
(Invasion of Private Affairs or Home Prohibited: “No person shall be disturbed in his private 
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Eavesdropping laws largely break down into two different types: one-
party consent and two-party—or all-party—consent.26  By way of 
example, in a one-party consent jurisdiction, if A and B are involved in a 
conversation, either A or B must consent to such a recording in order for 
that conversation to be lawfully recorded.27  Thus, if A consents to be 
recorded, recording the conversation falls outside the proscribed scope 
of the one-party consent eavesdropping law and no criminal act has 
occurred.28  For clarity, this essentially means that if A and B are 
talking, B does not have to be aware that she is being recorded. 
If, however, the same conversation were to occur in a two-party 
consent jurisdiction and B outright refused to consent to such a 
recording, or if the conversation was recorded without B’s knowledge, 
A would have committed criminal eavesdropping.29  In many 
jurisdictions, including Illinois, eavesdropping constitutes a felony 
offense.30  A conviction for eavesdropping generally carries not only a 
 
affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law.”). 
26. See text accompanying supra note 22 (collecting state eavesdropping statutes). 
27. Bast, supra note 22, at 149–50 (explaining the Federal Wiretapping Statute, which 
requires one-party consent, and how it is analogous to comparable state eavesdropping laws that 
similarly require one-party consent); see, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-11-30 (2005) (defining 
“eavesdrop” as “[t]o overhear, record, amplify or transmit any part of the private communication 
of others without the consent of at least one of the persons engaged in the communication, except 
as otherwise provided by law”). 
28. Typically, in one-party consent jurisdictions, consent by a party to the conversation is an 
affirmative defense or exception to a violation of the eavesdropping statute.  See, e.g., ME. REV. 
STAT. tit. 15, §§ 709(4) (2003) (precluding the sender or receiver, or consent given by either, as 
“to intercept” within the meaning of the statute); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:156A-4 (d) (2011) 
(providing an exception to the eavesdropping law when the person recording is a party to the 
conversation or has consented to the conversation). 
29. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.539c (2004) (“Any person who is present or who is 
not present during a private conversation and who willfully uses any device to eavesdrop upon 
the conversation without the consent of all parties thereto . . . is guilty of a felony . . . .”); 18 PA. 
CONS. STAT. § 5704(4) (2010) (stating that an exception to the prohibition of interception and 
disclosure of communications (eavesdropping) includes “where all parties to the communication 
have given prior consent to such interception.” (emphasis added)); see also Bast, supra note 6 at 
868–70.  For a complete list of two-party consent jurisdictions, see text accompanying supra note 
22. 
30. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 934.03(2)(a)(3)(d) (2001) (carrying a penalty of a felony of the 
third degree); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-2 (2012) (providing a class 4 felony for first offense); 
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-402 (2013) (providing for a felony conviction and not 
more than five years’ imprisonment); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 99(B)(2) (2010) (providing 
for imprisonment not more than five years); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.539c (2004) (providing 
for a felony punishable by imprisonment not to exceed two years); NEB. REV. STAT. § 86-
290(1)(e) (2008) (“[A]ny person who violates [the eavesdropping law] is guilty of a Class IV 
felony . . . .”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 570-A:2 (2003) (person who commits eavesdropping is 
guilty of a class B felony); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5704(4) (2010) (carrying a penalty of a felony 
of the third degree); see also Bast, supra note 6, at 928–30 (providing a table of the criminal 
penalties for eavesdropping in each state). 
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hefty fine,31 but also a potentially substantial period of incarceration.32 
Prior to Clark and Melongo, thirteen states required two-party 
consent for a conversation to be recorded.33  Clark and Melongo’s 
invalidation of the IEA notwithstanding,34 the December changes made 
by the Illinois General Assembly brought the IEA back within 
constitutional compliance, and again thirteen states require such 
consent.35  Most two-party consent states, however, only protect private 
conversations that the parties thereto do not intend for others to hear, as 
opposed to public conversations, which anyone could overhear.36  Put 
 
31. Fines for an eavesdropping conviction may amount up to $10,000 in some jurisdictions.  
See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1303(B) (2005) (“Any person who violates the provisions of 
this Section shall be fined not more than ten thousand dollars . . . .”); WIS. STAT. § 939.50 (2005) 
(eavesdropping conviction constitutes a Class H felony which carries a fine of up to $10,000). 
32. See text accompanying supra note 30 (providing states statutes that designate 
eavesdropping as a felony); see also R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-35-21(a) (2002) (any person found 
guilty of eavesdropping “shall be imprisoned for not more than five (5) years”).  In some 
jurisdictions, eavesdropping is only a misdemeanor.  See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-11-31 (2005) 
(eavesdropping constitutes a Class A misdemeanor which carries not more than one year 
imprisonment); ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 42.20.330 (2012) (providing for a Class A misdemeanor); 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6101(b)(1–3) (2014) (“Breach of privacy as defined in: (1) Subsection 
(a)(1) through (a)(5) is a class A nonperson misdemeanor.”). 
33. This list includes: California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, New Hampshire, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Washington.  
See text accompanying supra note 22 (collecting two-party consent eavesdropping statutes). 
34. See infra Part II.D (analyzing Clark and Melongo, which held the IEA unconstitutional). 
35. See infra Part IV.A (explaining the December changes made to the IEA). 
36. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 632(c) (2010) (construing a conversation as a “confidential 
communication,” which is defined as “any communication carried on in circumstances as may 
reasonably indicate that any party to the communication desires it to be confined to the parties 
thereto” and all conversations in public or in which the parties had no reasonable expectation of 
privacy); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-570d(a) (2002) (precluding a violation of recording when it “is 
preceded by verbal notification which is recorded at the beginning and is part of the 
communication by the recording party”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1335(a)(3) (2007) (“Installs 
or uses outside a private place any device for hearing, recording, amplifying or broadcasting 
sounds originating in that place which would not ordinarily be audible or comprehensible outside, 
without the consent of the person or persons entitled to privacy there . . . .”); FLA. STAT. § 
934.02(2) (2001) (“‘Oral communication’ means any oral communication uttered by a person 
exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to interception . . . .”); MD. 
CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-401(2)(i) (2013) (“‘Oral communication’ means any 
conversation or words spoken to or by any person in private conversation.”); MICH. COMP. LAWS 
§ 750.539c (2004) (specifically referring to a private conversation as the basis for statutory 
violation); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-213(1)(c) (2013) (protecting conversations where recording 
occurs without the knowledge or consent of the parties unless a person gives prior warning of the 
recording); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 570-A:1.II (2003) (“‘Oral communication’ means any verbal 
communication uttered by a person who has a reasonable expectation that the communication is 
not subject to interception, under circumstances justifying such expectation.”); OR. REV. STAT. § 
133.721(7)(a) (2013) (defining oral communication as any communication “uttered by a person 
exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to interception”); 18 PA. CONS. 
STAT. § 5702 (2000) (defining oral communication as “oral communication uttered by a person 
possessing an expectation that such communication is not subject to interception”); WASH. REV. 
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another way, aside from Massachusetts,37 and until recently Illinois, the 
other eleven two-party consent states do not criminalize the recording of 
a conversation in which the parties have no reasonable expectation of 
privacy.38  Massachusetts prohibits the recording of any conversation, 
even those that do not implicate any element of privacy.39  The other 
twelve two-party consent states—including Illinois, as of December 30, 
2014—would not criminalize the recording of such a conversation in 
this example, and neither would they prohibit the recording of public 
conversations where it is likely that another person may overhear its 
 
CODE § 9.73.030 (2010) (protecting private conversations alone); see also Robert J. Tomei Jr., 
Comment, Watching the Watchmen: The People’s Attempt to Hold On-Duty Law Enforcement 
Officers Accountable for Misconduct and the Illinois Law that Stands in Their Way, 32 N. ILL. U. 
L. REV. 385, 392 n.45–47 (2012). 
37. Massachusetts and Illinois had similar eavesdropping laws.  See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 
272, § 99(B)(2) (2010).  Massachusetts does not distinguish between the types of oral 
conversations that are prohibited from recording.  But see Jean v. Mass. State Police, 492 F.3d 24, 
31–33 (1st Cir. 2007) (holding that plaintiff Jean may succeed on the merits of a First 
Amendment claim because the Massachusetts State Police Department did not have an interest in 
protecting a conversation).  Jean called into question the validity of the Massachusetts law and 
begs the question whether or not the state will continue to adhere to a statute that does not 
demarcate between private and public conversations.  Although addressing the state’s wiretapping 
statute, in Massachusetts v. Glik, a Boston Municipal Court Judge found that the defendant could 
not have contravened Massachusetts’ wiretapping statute because by using his cell phone, the 
defendant recorded a police officer performing the officer’s public duties and that the statute only 
prohibits the “secret” interception of a conversation without consent of all of the parties.  Mass. v. 
Glik, No. 0701 CR 6687, slip op. at 2–3 (Boston Mun. Ct., Jan. 31, 2008), available at 
http://www.volokh.com/files/glik.pdf; see Jesse Harlan Alderman, Before You Press Record: 
Unanswered Questions Surrounding the First Amendment Right to Film Public Police Activity, 
33 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 485, 489–90 (2013) (discussing the Glik case in detail).  Additionally, the 
state court decision served as the basis for the decision of the First Circuit in a separate § 1983 
action brought by Glik.  “We thus conclude, on the facts of the complaint, that Glik’s recording 
was not “secret” within the meaning of Massachusetts’s wiretap statute, and therefore the officers 
lacked probable cause to arrest him.”  Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 88 (1st Cir. 2011). 
38. Compare MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 99 (2010) (defining an oral communication as 
“speech” without any mention to whether it protects private conversations alone), and 720 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. 5/14-1 (2012) (defining a conversation as “any oral communication between 2 or 
more persons regardless of whether one or more of the parties intended their communication to be 
of a private nature under circumstances justifying that expectation”), with text accompanying 
supra note 36 (collecting two-party consent jurisdictions’ definitions of a conversation). 
39. Tomei, supra note 36, at 393; see text accompanying supra note 38 (noting high criminal 
fines for eavesdropping).  Under Massachusetts’, and until recently Illinois’, statutory schemes, if 
one was to record a loud argument on a public street, that individual would have committed a 
crime.  See, e.g., People v. Melongo, 2014 IL 114852, ¶ 29 (noting that the IEA criminalized the 
recording of conversations that did not implicate any privacy interests, yet constituted a felony to 
record each one).  “A loud argument on the street, a political debate on a college quad, yelling 
fans at an athletic event, or any conversation loud enough that the speakers should expect to be 
heard by others.”  Id.  Recall that most two-party consent jurisdictions require that the parties had 
a reasonable expectation of privacy, thus, these examples smack in the face of nearly every state 
eavesdropping law.  See text accompanying supra note 36 (collecting two-party consent 
jurisdictions’ definitions of a conversation). 
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content.40 Typically, in these jurisdictions, an oral conversation is 
defined as that which the parties intended to be, or had a reasonable 
expectation would be, private.41  
Notwithstanding the thirteen two-party consent jurisdictions, every 
other state that has an eavesdropping law requires only one party to the 
conversation to consent for it to be recorded.42  With some context 
about the law of eavesdropping and what constitutes a criminal 
violation in other states, we are now ready to examine Illinois’ 
eavesdropping law—arguably one of the strictest in the country.43 
B.  Illinois Eavesdropping Law—Past to Present 
1.  Origin and Evolution of the Illinois Eavesdropping Act 
The original law protecting conversational privacy and prohibiting 
eavesdropping in Illinois was enacted in 1895.44  When the more 
modern version was codified in 1961, it was vague in its proscription.45  
 
40. See text accompanying supra note 36 (collecting two-party consent jurisdictions’ 
definitions of a conversation). 
41. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 570-A:1 (2012) (defining an oral communication as 
“any verbal communication uttered by a person who has a reasonable expectation that the 
communication is not subject to interception, under circumstances justifying such expectation”); 
WASH. REV. CODE § 9.73.030 (2014) (explicitly prohibiting the recording or interception of 
private conversations alone); see also text accompanying supra note 29 (collecting two-party 
consent jurisdictions’ definitions of a conversation). 
42. See text accompanying supra note 22 (collecting state eavesdropping statutes). 
43. In fact, when deciding ACLU. v. Alvarez, the Seventh Circuit conceded that “[a]s best we 
can tell, the [IEA] is the broadest of its kind . . . .”  679 F.3d 583, 595 n.4 (7th Cir. 2012) (citation 
omitted); see Stephanie Claiborne, Is it Justice or a Crime to Record the Police?: A Look at the 
Illinois Eavesdropping Statute and its Application, 45 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 485, 489 (2012) 
(“The [IEA] is particularly strict in that the statute specifically includes a provision making 
eavesdropping illegal regardless of whether the parties intended their communication to be 
private.”); Johnson, supra note 3 (stating that the IEA is one of the strictest eavesdropping laws in 
the nation); Schmadeke, supra note 3 (referring to the IEA as one of the strictest in the nation, 
which criminalizes conversations made in public without the consent of all of the parties thereto). 
44. It is debated between scholars whether the Illinois law started as an eavesdropping law or 
a wiretapping law.  Compare JOHN F. DECKER & CHRISTOPHER KOPACZ, ILLINOIS CRIMINAL 
LAW: A SURVEY OF CRIMES AND DEFENSES § 10.08 (5th ed. 2013) (describing the 1895 law as 
an eavesdropping provision grounded in privacy concerns for the conversations of private persons 
and government officials), with JOYCELYN M. POLLOCK, CRIMINAL LAW 433 (10th ed. 2013) 
(stating that Illinois outlawed wiretapping by law in 1895).  Sources agree, however, that a law 
was enacted in 1895, created as a byproduct of privacy concerns.  DECKER, supra at 10.08; 
POLLOCK, supra at 433.  The law was later codified in 1961.  See Claiborne, supra note 43, at 
491–93 (discussing the history of the IEA); Celia Guzaldo Gamrath, A Lawyer’s Guide to 
Eavesdropping in Illinois, 87 ILL. B.J. 362, 363–64 nn.7–14 (1999) (discussing the history of the 
law of eavesdropping in Illinois).  See generally People v. Beardsley, 503 N.E.2d 346, 348 (Ill. 
1986), superseded by statute as stated in People v. Clark, 2014 IL 115776, ¶ 17, 6 N.E.3d 154, 
159 (Ill. 2014) (noting that eavesdropping was codified in the criminal code of 1961). 
45. ILL. REV. STAT. 1961, ch. 38 §§ 206.1, 206.4; see Claiborne, supra note 43, at 491 
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The 1961 IEA defined a violation of eavesdropping as the “[use of] an 
eavesdropping device to hear or record all or any part of any oral 
conversation without the consent of any party thereto.”46  As of result of 
the ambiguity, in People v. Kurth, the Illinois Supreme Court decided 
whether the consent of “any party” meant one party to the conversation 
or every party to the conversation.47  Kurth involved several defendants 
who were charged with conspiracy to obtain money and property from 
an Illinois township.48  In an attempt to expose the alleged corruption, a 
State’s witness surreptitiously recorded conversations between the 
defendants, which according to the court, if properly admitted, served as 
evidence prejudicial to the matter of guilt.49  It was undisputed that the 
State’s witness was a party to conversation, and thus, the issue of the 
case turned on whether that alone was sufficient consent to record the 
conversations.50  The Illinois Supreme Court answered in the negative, 
holding that, in essence, the 1961 construction of the IEA required 
consent from each party to the conversation in order to be admissible 
against the defendants.51 
The court’s ruling in Kurth established a relationship between the 
Illinois General Assembly and the Illinois Supreme Court that has been 
tenuous at best in regard to the IEA.52  Over the following ten years, the 
 
(discussing early litigation surrounding the 1961 codification of the law); Gamrath, supra note 
44, at 363 (discussing the 1961 version of the eavesdropping statute). 
46. ILL. REV. STAT. 1961, ch. 38 §§ 206.1, 206.4 (emphasis added); People v. Kurth, 216 
N.E.2d 154, 157 (Ill. 1966), overruled by People v. Beardsley, 503 N.E.2d 346, 352 (Ill. 1986); 
Claiborne, supra note 43, at 491; Gamrath, supra note 44, at 363. 
47. Kurth, 216 N.E.2d at 157–58. 
48. Id. at 154. 
49. Id. at 157. 
50. Id. 
51. Id. at 158.  In reaching this conclusion, the court relied heavily on its interpretation of the 
legislative intent at the time of drafting the IEA. 
Having in mind this expression of legislative intent, we believe that it is unreasonable 
to suppose that the legislature intended that the consent of the party who is 
surreptitiously recording the conversation of others can make the recorded 
conversations admissible against the other parties, who were unaware that their 
conversations were being recorded. 
Id.  In his concurrence, Justice Schaefer protested that the court relied on an absolutely erroneous 
construction of the IEA, one that was contrary to the recognized definition of eavesdropping.  Id. 
at 159 (Schaefer, J., concurring).  To support his contention, Justice Schaefer gave this example: 
If the statute requires consent of all parties to a conversation, a businessman who, in 
the interest of preserving an accurate record, has his secretary listen in on an extension 
phone and take down the exact words used, commits a crime unless all other parties to 
the conversation consented to its recording in this fashion. 
Id. 
52. Until Clark and Melongo, the Illinois Supreme Court and the Illinois General Assembly 
went back and forth defining what was the true meaning and intent of the IEA.  Ultimately, the 
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IEA went through several amendments, culminating when substantial 
changes were made in 1976.53  In that set of amendments, section 14-
2(a)—the criminal portion of the IEA—was amended to explicitly 
require “consent of all of the parties.”54  While the language may appear 
clear, ambiguity ensued as to the proper meaning and application of the 
phrase “all of the parties.”55 
2.  People v. Beardsley and People v. Herrington: 
Eavesdropping Law Protects Privacy 
In 1986, the Illinois Supreme Court interpreted the linguistic change 
to the IEA in People v. Beardsley.56  In Beardsley, the defendant was 
convicted under the IEA for unlawfully recording a conversation 
between two police officers while he was under arrest in the back of a 
police car.57  On appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court, the defendant 
 
court finally determined that the General Assembly had legislated too broadly and held the IEA 
unconstitutionally overbroad in March of 2014.  See infra Part II.D (discussing the decisions in 
Clark and Melongo).  But see Part IV.A (explaining the December changes to the IEA). 
53. The 1961 version of the IEA was first amended in 1969 to redefine eavesdropping as to 
hear or record a conversation “unless he [did] so with the consent of any one party to such 
conversation and at the request of a State’s Attorney.”  1976 Ill. Laws, P.A. 76-1110, § 1 
(emphasis added); see Gamrath, supra note 44, at 364 (citing the 1969 amendment).  The IEA 
was then substantially amended in 1976.  See 1976 Ill. Laws, P.A. 79-1159, § 1.  Illinois courts 
also interpreted the IEA prior to the 1976 amendment; however, the decisions largely related to 
law enforcement procedures.  See, e.g., People v. Richardson, 328 N.E.2d 260 (Ill. 1975) (holding 
that the IEA permits eavesdropping with consent of one party to the conversation at the request of 
a State’s Attorney); People v. Klingenberg, 339 N.E.2d 456 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975) (holding that a 
law-enforcement officer’s use of audiovisual recording of driving-while-under-the-influence 
traffic stops satisfied the requirements of the IEA, and that the defendant did not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to coordination requests during the stop); People v. 
Giannopoulos, 314 N.E.2d 237 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974) (holding that where an officer is able to 
overhear the telephone conversation unaided by an eavesdropping device, there is no violation of 
the IEA by admitting such intercepted conversations into evidence). 
54. 1976 Ill. Laws, P.A. 79-1159, § 1; see Bast, supra note 6, at 876 (“The [IEA] had been 
amended in 1975 to require all-party consent.”); Gamrath, supra note 44, at 364 (discussing the 
amended statutory language which replaced the phrase “the consent of any one party” with the 
phrase “the consent of all the parties”). 
55. When confronted with People v. Beardsley in 1986, Illinois argued that the language of 
the IEA was clear in that each party’s consent must be acquired to record a conversation, making 
no mention of whether the conversation was intended to be private or secret.  People v. Beardsley, 
503 N.E.2d 346, 348 (Ill. 1986).  However, the defendant in Beardsley made the argument that a 
violation could only occur if the conversation was intended to be private; an argument that the 
court ultimately accepted.  Id. at 349, 352. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. at 347–48.  Beardsley had been pulled over for speeding and refused to give the 
attending officer his name or license, simply stating that he wanted to speak with a lawyer.  Id. at 
347.  The officer observed Beardsley attempting to record their interaction and subsequently 
radioed his supervising sergeant who responded to the scene in an attempt to persuade Beardsley 
to cooperate.  Id.  The officers were unsuccessful and placed Beardsley under arrest.  Id. at 348.  
While waiting for the tow truck, with Beardsley under arrest in the back seat of the police car, he 
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successfully argued, that because he was present during the 
conversation between the officers, he could not be found guilty of 
eavesdropping.58  More specifically, Beardsley contended that the IEA 
merely protected private and secret conversations.59  The court agreed, 
reasoning that because Beardsley was present during the conversation, 
and because the officers could have left the vehicle, the officers could 
not have had a reasonable expectation of privacy.60  In 1986, when 
Beardsley was decided, the court determined that the IEA prohibited 
only the surreptitious recording of a conversation in which the 
participants had a reasonable expectation of privacy.61  The court did 
not determine that the phrase “consent of all of the parties” meant that 
each party to a conversation must consent in order for a recording to 
happen.62  But rather, the court determined that lawful recording hinged 
on the conversants’ expectation of privacy.63 
In 1994, only a few years after the decision in Beardsley, the Illinois 
Supreme Court reaffirmed its Beardsley holding in People v. 
Herrington.64  This case involved a conversation between a victim of 
sexual abuse and the defendant, which was recorded by the victim with 
assistance from the police.65  While the trial court suppressed the 
recording as evidence, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed, stating, 
“there can be no reasonable expectation of privacy [to the victim] where 
the individual recording the conversation is a party to that 
conversation.”66  In this case, the victim of sexual abuse consented to 
 
again recorded the officers’ conversation.  Id.  This last recording was the substantive issue on 
appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court.  Id. 
58. Id. at 348–49. 
59. Id. at 348.  Beardsley made the argument that the court should adopt the common-law 
definition of eavesdropping and adhere to the common meaning: “that eavesdropping can occur 
only when parties intend their conversations to be secret or private.”  Id. 
60. Id. at 350–52. 
61. Id. at 349.  The court stated that it is not “whether all of the parties consented to the 
recording of the conversation[,] [r]ather, it is whether the officers/declarants intended their 
conversation to be of a private nature . . . .”  Id. at 350.  It seems here that the majority opinion 
considered the wording of the IEA “with the consent of all of the parties to such conversation,” 
id. at 348, to implicate reasonable expectations of privacy rather than all party consent for the 
recording to be lawful. 
62. See generally id. at 351–52 (illustrating that the analysis turned on expectations of privacy 
as opposed to consent from all parties). 
63. Id.  Justice Simon, concurring, articulated that “[t]he majority’s construction ignores the 
amendatory language [of the IEA] which replaced the word ‘any’ with the word ‘all.’”  Id. at 352 
(Simon, J., concurring); cf. Gamarth, supra note 44, at 364 (“Beardsley has been criticized for not 
being supported by the statutory language [of the IEA] requiring the consent of all of the parties 
to the conversation.”). 
64. People v. Herrington, 645 N.E.2d 957, 959 (Ill. 1994). 
65. Id. at 957. 
66. Id. at 958 (citing Beardsley, 503 N.E.2d at 351). 
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the recording, and therefore, the victim’s recording of the conversation 
between himself and the defendant could not constitute a violation of 
the IEA.67  Thus, the defendant’s argument that the tape could not be 
admitted because it was recorded illegally was rejected.68 
3.  The General Assembly Strikes Back 
In response to the Illinois Supreme Court’s ruling in Beardsley and 
its progeny, the General Assembly amended the IEA in 1994 to 
explicitly legislate away the court’s interpretation of a conversation.69  
While the portion of the IEA at issue in Beardsley and Herrington was 
not amended,70 a new definition of “conversation” was added to include 
protection for conversations in which individuals had no reasonable 
expectation of privacy.71  After the 1994 amendment, the IEA defined a 
conversation as “any oral communication between 2 or more persons 
regardless of whether one or more of the parties intended their 
communication to be of a private nature under circumstances justifying 
that expectation.”72  Thus, after the amendment, it became clear that the 
General Assembly intended to require all parties to any conversation to 
 
67. Id. at 959. 
68. Id. at 958.  The defendant attempted to persuade the court to accept the argument that the 
conversation, which served as the evidentiary basis for the charges, was illegally recorded.  Id.  If 
the court accepted this assertion, then the evidence would have to be excluded under 720 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. 5/14-5, which provides: 
Evidence Inadmissible. Any evidence obtained in violation of this Article is not 
admissible in any civil or criminal trial, or any administrative or legislative inquiry or 
proceeding, nor in any grand jury proceedings; provided, however, that so much of the 
contents of an alleged unlawfully intercepted, overheard or recorded conversation as is 
clearly relevant, as determined as a matter of law by the court in chambers, to the proof 
of such allegation may be admitted into evidence in any criminal trial or grand jury 
proceeding brought against any person charged with violating any provision of this 
Article. 
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-5 (2012). 
69. H.B. 356, 88th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., 1994 Ill. Laws, P.A. 88–677, § 14-1.  While 
passed under the guise of officer safety, it is clear from the Illinois Senate transcripts that the 
legislative intent was to overrule Beardsley.  See Senate Transcripts, H.B. 356, 88th Gen. 
Assemb., Reg. Sess., at 42 (May 20, 1994), available at http://www.ilga.gov/senate/transcripts/ 
strans88/ST052094.pdf (“[The bill adds language] to reverse the Beardsley eavesdropping case 
[in order to allow] consensual overhears by law enforcement in certain cases when necessary for 
officer safety . . . .”). 
70. The portion of the IEA at issue was 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-2(a), which sets out the 
substantive crime of eavesdropping and delineates the elements of the offense. 
71. H.B. 356, 88th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., 1994 Ill. Laws, P.A. 88–677, § 14-1; see 
Claiborne, supra note 43, at 493 & nn.53–54 (arguing that the General Assembly explicitly 
amended the IEA to overrule Beardsley); Gamrath, supra note 44, at 365 (“This new definition of 
conversation potentially reverses Beardsley and Herrington interpretations and restores the legal 
requirement of all-party consent to the [IEA].”). 
72. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-1(d) (2012) (emphasis added). 
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consent in order for any lawful recording to take place.73 
A few technical changes were made in subsequent years, including 
adding a culpable mens rea requirement to the IEA in 2000.74  
However, when the Illinois Supreme Court confronted the IEA yet 
again in Clark and Melongo in 2014, section 14-2(a)(1)(A) read: 
(a) A person commits eavesdropping when he: (1) Knowingly and 
intentionally uses an eavesdropping device for the purpose of hearing 
or recording all or any part of any conversation or intercepts, retains, 
or transcribes electronic communication unless he does so (A) with the 
consent of all of the parties to such conversation or electronic 
communication . . . .75 
With the present definition of conversation added to the IEA, and the 
explicit overruling of Beardsley and its progeny, the IEA did not 
distinguish between private and non-private conversations, or rather, 
conversations in which no discernible expectation of privacy is 
present.76  A recording of either type of conversation, private or public, 
constituted a felony.77  While there are a plethora of exceptions to the 
IEA, they mainly relate to law-enforcement procedures.78 
4.  American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois v. Alvarez 
In 2012, the Seventh Circuit decided American Civil Liberties Union 
 
73. People v. Clark, 2014 IL 115776, ¶ 17, 6 N.E.3d 154 (Ill. 2014); see Claiborne, supra note 
43, at 493 & nn.53–54 (discussing the Illinois legislature’s definition of “communication”); 
Gamrath, supra note 44, at 365 (“Significantly, this [amendment] seems to incorporate the 
privacy requirement back into the statute.”). 
74. H.B. 526, 91st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., 1999 Ill. Laws, P.A. 91–567, § 14-2. 
75. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-2(a)(1)(A) (2012); Clark, 2014 IL 115776, ¶ 14, 6 N.E.3d at 
158–59. 
76. Clark, 2014 IL 115776, ¶¶ 17–18, 6 N.E.3d at 159–60; People v. Melongo, 2014 IL 
114852, ¶ 28, 6 N.E.3d 120, 126 (Ill. 2014). 
77. If the recording occurred between two private parties, then a first offense of the IEA 
constituted a Class 4 felony carrying a minimum sentence of one year but not more than three 
years’ incarceration.  720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-4(a) (2012); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-4.5-45 
(2012).  A second, or subsequent, violation of the IEA constituted a Class 3 felony carrying a 
term of not less than two years but not more than five years’ incarceration.  720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
5/14-4(a); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-4.5-40.  If, however, the defendant recorded a conversation 
of a law-enforcement official, State’s Attorney, Attorney General, or judge while performing their 
official duties, a conviction resulted in a Class 1 felony carrying a minimum term of 
imprisonment of four years but not more than fifteen years.  720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-4(b); 730 
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-4.5-30; see Alderman, supra note 37, at 497 (“Somewhat remarkably, the 
[IEA] elevates the offense to a class 1 felony . . . if any of the recorded parties is performing 
duties as a law enforcement officer.”). 
78. The exemptions under the IEA range from television and radio broadcasts, to consumer 
hotlines, to law-enforcement purposes in conjunction with the State’s Attorney, to law-
enforcement stops, to collecting evidence under reasonable suspicion that a crime has been or is 
being committed against the recorder.  720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-3(a)–(q) (2012). 
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of Illinois v. Alvarez, in which the court questioned the constitutionality 
of the IEA.79  The American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois (“ACLU”) 
planned to implement a “police accountability program” that would 
record police officers performing their duties in public places.80  Before 
implementing its program, the ACLU filed a pre-enforcement action 
against the Cook County State’s Attorney seeking declaratory and 
injunctive relief barring enforcement of the IEA.81  The court called into 
question the validity of the IEA, stating that it legislated too broadly, 
“restrict[ing] a medium of expression commonly used for the 
preservation and communication of information and ideas . . . .”82  The 
court reasoned that the IEA was overbroad because the statute made it 
“a crime to audio record any conversation, even those that are not in fact 
private,” and therefore have no reasonable expectation of privacy.83 
The decision, however, was not without challenge, inviting a fiery 
dissent from Judge Richard A. Posner.84  The learned judge stated that 
the majority conceded the IEA’s objective of conversational privacy, 
“but [the majority] thinks there can be no conversational privacy when 
the conversation takes place in a public place . . . .”85  Thus, Posner 
posited that the court’s ruling cast a shadow of doubt on other states’ 
eavesdropping statutes because nearly all conversations, no matter how 
private, may be susceptible to sophisticated interception.86  Judge 
Posner’s critique notwithstanding, the invalidity of the IEA was 
confirmed by the Illinois Supreme Court’s decisions in Clark and 
Melongo.87  These decisions are addressed and examined in Part II.D.  
A particular type of eavesdropping, however—the secret recording of a 
private conversation without the consent of every party thereto—is 
again illegal in Illinois after the General Assembly acted in December 
2014; a mere nine months after Clark and Melongo.88 
 
79. ACLU v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2012). 
80. Id. at 586. 
81. Id. at 586, 588. 
82. Id. at 586, 595, 606. 
83. Id. at 606. 
84. Id. at 608–14 (Posner, J., dissenting). 
85. Id. at 613. 
86. Id. at 609–10. 
87. See generally Janan Hanna, What Next for Eavesdropping Law in Illinois?, 102 ILL. B.J. 
214 (2014) (discussing how Illinois is without an eavesdropping statute after the two decisions).  
While ACLU v. Alvarez was a pre-enforcement suit, the trial court in Melongo relied heavily on 
its reasoning, and the case was critical in the sequence of events which led to the Illinois Supreme 
Court’s ruling.  See infra Part II.D.2 (describing the reliance on the reasoning from ACLU v. 
Alvarez in the Melongo decision). 
88. See infra Part IV.A (explaining the December changes to the IEA). 
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C.  What, Exactly, is a Workplace Recording Policy? 
At its most basic level, a workplace recording policy prohibits 
employees from recording any conversations or meetings that occur 
with other employees or supervisors.89  Consider, for example, Whole 
Foods Market Group’s recording policy, which prohibits “record[ing] 
conversations with a tape recorder or other recording device (including 
a cell phone or any electronic device) [without prior leadership 
approval].”90  Or, for comparison, J.P. Morgan Chase’s policy on 
workplace recording: “No photo or video or audio recording taken on 
Company premises or at work-related events may be circulated, posted 
or distributed (on the Internet or otherwise) without prior approval.”91  
While the latter policy does not explicitly proscribe the recording of any 
conversations, but rather any sort of content dissemination, both are 
quite broad in the types of behavior that they prohibit.92 
Whole Foods goes so far as to spell out the purpose of its policy, 
which is “to eliminate a chilling effect to the expression of views that 
may exist when one person is concerned that his or her conversation 
with another is being secretly recorded.”93  Fostering an open and 
collaborative workplace environment, without the fear that an 
individual’s words and actions are being recorded while at work, is 
certainly a noble goal, and one that should be advanced.94  There are, 
however, many other important elements that give rise to such recording 
policies—policies that arguably also curtail free expression in the 
workplace.95  For one, a workplace recording policy protects the 
proprietary information of all employees as well as the company itself.96  
 
89. See generally Whole Foods Market, Inc., 1518 N.L.R.B. No. 01-CA-096965, 2013 WL 
5838721 (Div. of Judges Oct. 30, 2013) (illustrating a workplace recording policy). 
90. Id. 
91. Code of Conduct, J.P. MORGAN CHASE & CO. 1, 32 (Nov. 2013), http://www.jpmorgan 
chase.com/corporate/About-JPMC/document/Code_-of-Conduct_Nov2013.pdf. 
92. Compare Whole Foods Market, Inc., 1518 N.L.R.B. No. 01-CA-096965, with Code of 
Conduct, supra note 91 (prohibiting the dissemination of any conversations without prior 
approval). 
93. Whole Foods Market, Inc., 1518 N.L.R.B. No. 01-CA-096965. 
94. See id. (stating that Whole Foods articulates that its policy is set forth “to encourage open 
communication [and the] free exchange of ideas . . . .”). 
95. Cf. Whole Foods Market, Inc., 1518 N.L.R.B. No. 01-CA-096965 (noting that while 
Whole Foods prohibits employee recording to encourage open communication, it also subjects 
employees and patrons, to security and surveillance camera monitoring); Bast, supra note 6, at 
849 (discussing the rise of employee taping in an effort to gain more workplace rights as well as 
to gather crucial evidence of potential employment discrimination and sexual harassment 
allegations). 
96. See infra notes 97–98 and accompanying text (discussing the various reasons that 
technology companies proffer for restricting recording in pursuit of protection of proprietary 
information). 
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Certain industries and companies rely on being the first to create or 
market a product.97  This competitive edge is best protected when the 
employer has taken steps to ensure that information is not leaked to 
outsiders.98  Google Glass, for example, recently sparked a great deal of 
concern over the potential for workplace espionage and the need to 
protect confidential information of both personal and professional 
natures.99  Thus, presented here are at least some reasons for why an 
employer would institute a recording policy. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
Clearly, workplace recording policies have some legitimate 
justifications.100  Moreover, these policies are not new phenomena, and 
courts have favorably addressed the validity of such policies in a variety 
of jurisdictions.101  The recording policies that are addressed in this Part 
 
97. See, e.g., Business Conduct: The Way We Do Business Worldwide, APPLE, INC. (Oct. 
2014), http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/AAPL/1635337056x0x443008/5f38b1e6-2f9c-451 
8-b691-13a29ac90501/business_conduct_policy.pdf (stating that a core business principle of 
Apple is the confidentiality of Apple’s information); see also Adriana Lee, Apple Handbook 
Shushes Employees from Talking about the Company, TECHNOBUFFALO (Dec. 2, 2011), 
http://www.technobuffalo.com/2011/12/02/apple-handbook-shushes-employees-from-talking-abo 
ut-the-company/ (describing an extensive policy promulgated by Apple regarding an employee’s 
interaction with co-workers, the publication, or lack thereof, of information, and the paramount 
need for confidentiality of Apple’s proprietary information). 
98. See Lee, supra note 97 (using Apple’s confidentiality policies as an example); see also 
Code of Conduct, GOOGLE, INC., http://investor.google.com/corporate/code-of-conduct.html#toc-
confidentiality (last visited Apr. 26, 2015) (“Google’s ‘confidential information’ includes 
financial, product and user information.  Make sure that confidential company material stays that 
way; don’t disclose it outside of Google without authorization.”). 
99. Khurram Nasir Gore et al., Controlling Legal Risk of Google Glass and Wearable Tech, 
CORP. COUNSEL (May 27, 2014) (arguing that Google Glass has sparked concerns about security 
and safety in the workplace because those other than the user do not know when the device is 
recording); see Anisha Mehta, Comment, “Bring Your Own Glass”: The Privacy Implications of 
Google Glass in the Workplace, 30 J. MARSHALL J. INFO. TECH. & PRIVACY L. 607, 609 (2014) 
(emphasizing the privacy implications of wearable technology like Google Glass and stating that 
“[t]he discreet nature of wearable technology is combined with the aspect of instantaneous 
dissemination of information to create this surreptitious and privacy-intrusive device”).  Google 
Glass is an optical-head mounted smart device, essentially like a smartphone computer worn on 
the head.  Mehta, supra at 609.  Glass is part of a new category of emerging digital products 
called “wearable tech,” which, collectively, refers to watches, health monitors, passive cameras, 
etc.  Nasir Gore et al., supra; see Mehta, supra, at 608–09 (discussing different types of wearable 
technology).  The common feature of these products is that they are always on—at least always in 
the open—and become integrated into the daily routine of the user.  See Nasir Gore et al., supra 
(stating that wearable devises are always on and do not require “the user to break away from a 
real-life interaction to use them”). 
100. See text accompanying supra notes 93–99 (discussing some of the reasons for workplace 
recording policies). 
101. See, e.g., Capeless v. Dep’t of Veteran Affairs, 78 M.S.P.R. 619 (June 24, 1998) 
(upholding employee discipline for a violation of a workplace recording policy); Sternberg v. 
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have arisen in both one-party consent and two-party consent 
jurisdictions.102  First, this Part addresses how federal courts have 
interpreted different workplace recording policies.  Second, this Part 
discusses the recent Illinois Supreme Court decisions in Clark and 
Melongo. 
A.  Seventh Circuit Upholds Discipline for Workplace Recording 
The IEA had been examined in the context of workplace recording 
prior to Clark and Melongo.103  In 2008, the Seventh Circuit addressed 
the IEA in Argyropoulos v. City of Alton.104  The case involved the 
termination of Christina Argyropoulos, who worked as a jailor for the 
City of Alton, Illinois Police Department.105  Argyropoulos worked for 
the city for a mere ten months before she was discharged.106  During her 
employment, Argyropoulos’ job performance was the subject of 
considerable criticism.107  Job performance, however, was not the only 
issue.108  Seven weeks prior to her discharge, Argyropoulos complained 
to supervisors that another jailor had sexually harassed her.109  In 
response, the police department began to investigate and took measures 
to ensure that Argyropoulos and the fellow jailor were not left 
unsupervised.110  The encounters with the fellow jailor continued, 
however, even while not at work.111  Argyropoulos’ questionable job 
performance continued as well, with one supervisor indicating that 
“[w]ithout constant supervision, Jailer [sic] Argyropoulos fails to 
accomplish minimal job tasks . . . .”112  Subsequently, Argyropoulos 
was called into a meeting with her supervisors, which she erroneously 
believed was about the status of her sexual harassment complaint.113  It 
 
Dep’t of Defense Dependents Schs., 41 M.S.P.R. 46, 48 (June 6, 1989) (discussing one charge of 
discipline which stemmed from the employee tape-recording conversations with personnel 
without permission); see infra Part II.C (federal circuits and district courts interpreting workplace 
recording policies). 
102. See infra Parts II.A (Seventh Circuit interpreting Illinois’ two-party consent law); Part 
II.C (Sixth Circuit interpreting Ohio’s one-party consent law). 
103. Argyropoulos v. City of Alton, 539 F.3d 724 (7th Cir. 2008). 
104. Id. 
105. Id. at 727. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. at 729–30. 
108. Id. at 727. 
109. Id. 
110. Id. at 729. 
111. Argyropoulos reported that while walking down a public way outside of work, a pickup 
truck, of which she believed contained the harassing jailor, drove past her and yelled lewd 
comments at her.  Id. 
112. Id. at 730. 
113. Id. at 730. 
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was not, however, and Argyropoulos became hostile when her 
supervisors instead addressed the quality of her work and recent 
complaints concerning her job performance.114  Feeling “terrified,” 
Argyropoulos activated a tape recorder and surreptitiously recorded the 
conversation with her supervisors.115 
Two days after the Alton Police Department discovered 
Argyropoulos’ recording, she was fired from the department.116  The 
Chief of Police gave reasons of poor job performance and the illegal 
and surreptitious recording as explanation for her discharge.117  
Following her termination, Argyropoulos filed suit against the city for 
wrongful termination and violations under Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964.118  Argyropoulos contended that her termination was a 
retaliatory action in response to her earlier harassment claims.119  
Moreover, she asserted that the eavesdropping and performance reasons 
given by the chief were merely pretextual justifications for the adverse 
employment action.120 
The Seventh Circuit was unpersuaded by Argyropoulos’ argument 
and affirmed the district court grant of summary judgment.121 The court 
held that Argyropoulos failed to meet the required elements under either 
the direct or indirect methods of asserting a Title VII retaliation 
claim.122  The court reasoned that while Title VII does protect an 
employee who complains of discrimination, “the statute does not grant 
the aggrieved employee a license to engage in dubious self-help tactics 
or workplace espionage in order to gather evidence of 
discrimination.”123  The court concluded that this was a legitimate 
 
114. Id. 
115. Id. 
116. Id. at 730–31. 
117. Id. at 731.  The chief gave a third reason for the termination decision regarding the 
untruthful statements, which Argyropoulos gave to officers while they investigated the 
eavesdropping and attempted to uncover the tape recorder.  Id. 
118. By virtue of her employment, Argyropoulos was a member of the American Federation 
of State, County, and Municipal Employees (“AFSCME”) union.  Id. at 728.  Therefore, in lieu of 
a lawsuit, Argyropoulos could have challenged her termination by filing a union grievance or by 
requesting a hearing before the Civil Service Commission per her union contract.  Id. at 731.  As 
the court noted, she instead decided to pursue a lawsuit after she received notice of her right to 
sue from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”).  Id. at 731–32.  For more 
information about the process for filing a charge with the EEOC, see generally U.S. EQUAL 
EMP.’T. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N., http://www.eeoc.gov/ (last visited Apr. 26, 2015). 
119. Argyropoulos, 539 F.3d at 732. 
120. Id. at 736–37. 
121. Id. at 738, 741. 
122. Id. at 741; see infra Part II.B and note 132 (describing how an employee must establish 
evidence of retaliation under either the direct or indirect methods of proof). 
123. Argyropoulos, 539 F.3d at 734.  Here, the court also drew on its 2002 decision in Hall v. 
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disciplinary decision and clearly not retaliatory.124  In its reasoning, the 
court considered the fact that the termination occurred just two days 
after the police department learned of the recording made it unlikely 
that this served as pretext for retaliation from the complained of 
harassment that occurred seven weeks earlier.125  As a final note, the 
court stated that it does not sit as a “super personnel review board” and 
would neither review nor second-guess otherwise facially legitimate 
employer discipline decisions.126 
B.  Title VII: Protected Employee Activities, and Pretext 
Before addressing how other federal courts have interpreted employer 
discipline for employees that commit eavesdropping, some context 
regarding Title VII may be helpful.  Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 prevents employers from discriminating against employees on the 
basis of sex, national origin, race, color, and other protected groups 
under federal law.127  Section 2000e–3(a) specifically prohibits 
employers from retaliating against an employee who opposed an 
unlawful employment practice, e.g., discriminatory adverse 
employment actions based on a protected group identification.128  This 
includes an employee who makes allegations, testifies, or aids in the 
investigation of unlawful employment practices.129  This provision 
serves as an anti-retaliatory provision that shields and protects 
employees who might otherwise fear adverse employment action by an 
employer for exposing or aiding in the investigation of allegations of 
discrimination.130  This anti-retaliation principle operates to protect 
against employer interference “by prohibiting employer actions that are 
likely to deter victims of discrimination from complaining to the EEOC, 
the courts, or their employers.”131 
 
Bodine Electric Co., which held that although an employee may complain of harassment or 
discrimination, that does not immunize the employee from any subsequent and unrelated 
discipline, including inappropriate workplace behavior.  Hall v. Bodine Elec. Co., 276 F.3d 345, 
359 (7th Cir. 2002). 
124. Argyropoulos, 539 F.3d at 741. 
125. Id. at 737–38. 
126. Id. at 736.  The court stated that it is not “a ‘super personnel review board’ that second-
guesses an employer’s facially legitimate business decisions.  We would hardly be so foolish as to 
suggest that insubordination is not a legitimate reason for an employer to fire an employee.”  Id. 
(citing Culver v. Gorman & Co., 416 F.3d 540, 547 (7th Cir. 2005)). 
127. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a) (2012). 
128. Id. 
129. Id. 
130. Id. 
131. Argyropoulos, 539 F.3d at 733 (quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 
U.S. 53, 68 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 
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Once an employee believes that he or she has been retaliated against 
for engaging in a Title VII statutorily protected activity, the individual 
must establish and prove that retaliation under either a direct or indirect 
method of proof.132  In federal court, absent direct evidence of 
retaliatory treatment, as is typically the case, courts must analyze the 
Title VII claim under the McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green burden-
shifting test.133  To satisfy this test, an employee must first establish her 
prima facie case of retaliation.134  After an employee has established her 
prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the employer to provide a 
non-discriminatory, legitimate reason for the adverse employment 
action.135  If the employer is able to provide a legitimate and lawful 
reason for the adverse employment action, the burden then shifts back 
to the employee.136  In order to overcome the apparent legitimate 
reason, the employee must prove that such proffered reason is in fact a 
pretext for the retaliation.137 
 
337, 346 (1997) (holding that the primary purpose of the anti-retaliatory provisions of Title VII is 
to maintain “unfettered access to statutory remedial mechanisms”). 
132. See generally McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (establishing a 
burden-shifting framework to determine whether under the indirect method of proof a plaintiff 
has shown that the employer engaged in a Title VII violation of an employee’s statutorily 
protected activities).  To assert a Title VII claim, the employee has two methods in order to prove 
employer retaliation.  The direct method requires a showing that: (1) the employee engaged in a 
statutorily protected activity; (2) the employee suffered a materially adverse action; and (3) a 
showing of a causal connection that exists between the two.  Jones v. St. Jude Med. S.C., Inc., 
504 F. App’x 473, 476 (6th Cir. 2012); Argyropoulos, 539 F.3d at 733.  In the alternative, the 
employee may assert a Title VII retaliation violation under the indirect method of proof.  Jones, 
504 F. App’x at 476; Argyropoulos, 539 F.3d at 733.  The first two elements of the indirect 
method parallel the direct method; however, the employer must additionally show that: (3) the 
employee met the employer’s legitimate expectations—that is, performing the job satisfactorily—
and (4) that the employee was treated less favorably than a similarly-situated employee who did 
not engage in a protected activity.  Jones, 504 F. App’x at 476; Argyropoulos, 539 F.3d at 733. 
133. Jones, 504 F. App’x at 476; see generally McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 
792 (1973).  In 2012, Judge Diane Wood for the Seventh Circuit articulated a new test, in 
opposition to the outdated burden-shifting test, which has gained substantial favor within the 
circuit.  Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 863 (7th Cir. 2012) (Wood, J., concurring).  The 
new test provides a simple framework requiring only that the plaintiff raise evidence sufficient 
that a rational jury could find that the employee took adverse employment action for an unlawful 
reason.  Id.; see Carlson v. CSX Transp., Inc., 758 F.3d 819, 830 (7th Cir. 2014). 
134. See text accompanying supra note 132 (describing how an employee must establish 
evidence of retaliation under either the direct or indirect methods of proof). 
135. Jones, 504 F. App’x at 476–77. 
136. See generally text accompanying supra note 132 (describing how an employee must 
establish evidence of retaliation under either the direct or indirect methods of proof). 
137. Jones, 504 F. App’x at 476–77; Argyropoulos, 539 F.3d at 735–36; see Grube v. Lau 
Indus., Inc., 257 F.3d 723, 730 (7th Cir. 2001) (“A ‘pretext for discrimination’ means more than 
an unusual act; it means something worse than a business error; ‘pretext’ means deceit used to 
cover one’s tracks.” (citing Kulumani v. Blue Cross Blue Shield Ass’n, 224 F.3d 681, 684 (7th 
Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted))); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1307 (9th ed. 2009) 
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This discussion barely scratches the surface of Title VII retaliation 
and discrimination claims against employers.138  However, for the 
purposes of this Comment it should be a sufficient background to 
understand the framework of such claims.  The potential for employees 
to bring claims of pretextual retaliation against employers when the 
individual is discharged for violations of a workplace recording policy 
will be addressed later in this Comment.139 
C.  Persuasive Authority: Other Circuit Interpretations 
The Sixth Circuit recently examined an employee recording case in 
2012 in Jones v. St. Jude Medical S.C., Inc.140  While the Sixth Circuit 
was examining Ohio’s one-party consent law,141 the decision parallels 
the Argyropoulos court’s reasoning and provides insight for Illinois 
courts confronting the issue.142  In Jones, the plaintiff, an African-
American female, worked as medical-device salesperson for the 
defendant, a seller of such devices.143  After Jones was removed from 
significant accounts, she began surreptitiously recording conversations 
with clients, other employees, and management to gather evidence of 
what she alleged was discriminatory treatment.144  In light of 
performance issues, as well as Jones’ disloyalty as evidenced by the 
recordings, the defendant decided to terminate Jones.145  Jones 
subsequently brought action against the company alleging retaliation 
under Title VII, as well as several other claims.146  One of Jones’ 
 
(“Pretext. . . . A false or weak reason or motive advanced to hide the actual or strong reason or 
motive.”). 
138. See generally Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The 40th Anniversary of Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, Symposium: Introduction, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 353 (2005) (discussing 
race and sex discrimination in Title VII cases); Eboneé N. Hamilton et al., Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, 2 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 521 (2001) (discussing and analyzing Title VII). 
139. See infra Part III.B. 
140. Jones, 504 F. App’x. at 473. 
141. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2933.51–2933.66 (2014). 
142. Although Ohio’s eavesdropping law is substantially different than that which the Illinois 
Supreme Court invalidated in Clark and Melongo, it is particularly important for analysis of 
employer recording policies.  See infra Part III.B (discussing potential allegations of pretext in 
response to a legitimate discharge for violation of an employer’s workplace recording policy). 
143. Jones, 504 F. App’x at 474. 
144. Id. 
145. Id. at 475.  A Senior Vice President for the company said that “[he] was unaware of any 
employee who had violated the recording policy and had not been fired for the violation.”  Id. at 
476. 
146. Id.  The other causes of actions include claims under the Equal Pay Act and wage 
discrimination under the Ohio Revised Code.  Id.  For the purposes of this Comment, however, 
only the Title VII claim is addressed.  Specifically, the argument that termination for violations of 
the company’s recording policy was a pretext for the alleged discriminatory treatment. 
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allegations was that although she violated the company recording 
policy—which she conceded would normally be sufficient for 
termination—she was immune from such action because the 
surreptitious recording was a protected activity under Title VII.147 
The Sixth Circuit did not agree with Jones’ characterization of the 
law and affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment.148  
First, the record reflected that even after discovering that such recording 
was a violation of a company policy, Jones continued to record 
conversations.149  Second, the court found that it was unnecessary for 
Jones to violate the workplace recording policy in order to oppose the 
alleged discrimination; therefore, the recordings were unreasonable.150  
The court postulated several alternative avenues that Jones could have 
pursued to oppose the alleged discriminatory treatment—including 
writing down the substance of the conversations or simply asking for 
permission to record.151  Similarly, the court rejected the argument that 
because the recordings were legal it was not unreasonable to breach the 
company policy.152 
Not all circuits have been consistent with each other, and the Second 
Circuit has explicitly held the opposite of determinations made by the 
Sixth and Seventh Circuits.153  Heller v. Champion International 
Corp.,154 decided by the Second Circuit in 1989, reflects this 
inconsistency.  Heller involved an employee who recorded 
conversations with a supervisor under the belief that the company was 
planning to demote him and discriminate against him due to his age.155  
Upon learning that Heller had been recording conversations, he was 
confronted by supervisors, and after admitting to such recordings, he 
was fired “for cause.”156  The Second Circuit held that Heller’s act of 
recording was not a legitimate basis for his termination.157  The court 
did not accept the premise that an employee would never be justified in 
 
147. Id. at 479. 
148. Id. at 481. 
149. Id. at 475. 
150. Id. at 481. 
151. Id. 
152. Id. 
153. See, e.g., Heller v. Champion Int’l Corp., 891 F.2d 432, 433, 437 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding 
that the plaintiff could have been gathering evidence in support of a possible age discrimination 
claim when he recorded conversations with a supervisor). 
154. Id. 
155. Id. at 433–35. 
156. Id. at 435. 
157. Id. 
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secretly recording conversations with his or her supervisors.158  It did, 
however, make note that such surreptitious recording represented 
disloyalty to the company.159  Nevertheless, the court went on to state 
that the recording was “not necessarily the kind of disloyalty that under 
these circumstances would warrant dismissal as a matter of law.”160 
The Heller court’s interpretation of an employee’s termination for 
recording is an outlier.  Many other federal district courts throughout 
the country have held similarly to the Argyropoulos and Jones courts 
and paralleled the reasoning.161  Although all federal decisions are 
persuasive authority to Illinois courts, their reasoning may still be useful 
if a case arises that involves discharge for violation of a workplace 
recording policy.162 
D.  Go Ahead, Record Anything 
On March 20, 2014 the Illinois Supreme Court handed down two 
decisions, which held that the IEA was unconstitutionally overbroad,163 
and criminalized a wide range of otherwise innocent conduct.164  While 
both are criminal cases that involve the invalidation of a criminal 
statute, the consequences indirectly affect employment law as well. 
1.  People v. Clark 
The first of the Illinois Supreme Court eavesdropping decisions 
handed down in March 2014 was People v. Clark.165  In Clark, the 
 
158. Id. at 436. 
159. Id. 
160. Id. 
161. See, e.g., Soloman v. Phila. Newspapers, Inc., No. 05-05326, 2008 WL 2221856 (E.D. 
Pa. 2008), aff’d, 2009 WL 215340 (3d Cir. 2009) (granting an employer’s motion for summary 
judgment because the decision to terminate the employee for surreptitiously recording co-workers 
was a facially legitimate employment action); Bodoy v. N. Arundel Hosp., 945 F. Supp. 890 (D. 
Md. 1996), aff’d, 112 F.3d 508 (4th Cir. 1997) (granting a motion for summary judgment because 
the employee was unable to establish a causal connection between his protected activity and his 
discharge to rebut the employer’s legitimate adverse employment action for surreptitiously taping 
conversations with a supervisor); Deiters v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 842 F. Supp. 1023 (M.D. 
Tenn. 1993) (holding that an employer’s discharge of an employee for surreptitious recording of 
meeting was legitimate in an absence of a showing by the employee that the action was 
pretextual). 
162. See infra Part IV.C (discussing how courts should react to workplace recording policies 
post Clark, Melongo, and the December changes to the IEA). 
163. People v. Clark, 2014 IL 115776, ¶¶ 25–26, 6 N.E.3d 154 (Ill. 2014); People v. Melongo, 
2014 IL 114852, ¶¶ 26, 36, 6 N.E.3d 120 (Ill. 2014).  It is interesting to note that in both cases the 
judgment of the Illinois Supreme Court was unanimous, inviting no dissent.  Chief Justice 
Garman delivered the judgment and subsequent opinions in these cases, with Justices Freeman, 
Thomas, Kilbride, Burke, and Theis concurring in both the judgment and opinions. 
164. Melongo, 2014 IL 114852, ¶ 29. 
165. Clark, 2014 IL 115776. 
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defendant was in court regarding a child-support matter.166  It was 
alleged that Clark surreptitiously recorded various conversations 
between himself, an attorney representing the other party, and a circuit 
court judge acting in the performance of official duties.167  Clark, 
however, contended that he had a good reason to record the 
conversations.168  Clark alleged that because there was not a court 
reporter present during the conversations, he decided to record the 
proceedings in order to maintain an accurate record of the matters 
therein.169  Clark reasoned that he was entitled to protection under the 
First Amendment, which would allow him to record public officials 
performing their public duties.170  The circuit court agreed with Clark 
and granted his motion to dismiss.171  Subsequently, because the circuit 
court found a criminal statute unconstitutional, the State took an 
immediate appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court.172 
After a review of the history of the IEA, including Beardsley, 
Herrington, and the 1994 amendment to the IEA, the Illinois Supreme 
Court held Section 14-2(a)(1)(A) of the IEA unconstitutionally 
overbroad and in violation of the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.173  Specifically, the court invalidated the requirement of 
two-party consent in order to effectuate a legal and legitimate recording 
of a conversation.174  The court reasoned that the IEA was overbroad 
because of the substantial number of its unconstitutional applications 
weighed against the IEA’s legitimate sweep—that is, prohibiting the 
recording of clearly private conversations.175  By way of example, the 
 
166. Id. ¶ 3. 
167. Id. ¶ 1. 
168. Id. ¶ 3. 
169. Id. 
170. Id. 
171. Id. ¶ 7. 
172. Id. ¶¶ 7–9.  Pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 603, when a circuit court finds a 
criminal statute unconstitutional, appeal lies directly with the Illinois Supreme Court.  ILL. SUP. 
CT. R. 603 (2013) (“Appeals in criminal cases in which a statute of the United States or of this 
State has been held invalid shall lie directly to the Supreme Court as a matter of right.  All other 
appeals in criminal cases shall be taken to the Appellate Court.”). 
173. Clark, 2014 IL 115776, ¶ 23.  At the time Clark was decided, section (a)(1)(A) of the 
IEA read: 
(a) A person commits eavesdropping when he: (1) Knowingly and intentionally uses an 
eavesdropping device for the purpose of hearing or recording all or any part of any 
conversation or intercepts, retains, or transcribes electronic communication unless he 
does so (A) with the consent of all of the parties to such conversation or electronic 
communication . . . . 
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-2(a)(1)(A) (2012) (emphasis added). 
174. Clark, 2014 IL 115776, ¶ 23. 
175. Id. ¶¶ 22–23. 
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court illustrated that if a person overhears a conversation, that individual 
may repeat the substance of the conversation, or even take notes, write 
it down, and publish it.176  If, however, that same individual were to 
record the conversation, with some sort of audio recording device, it 
would then become a criminal act.177  Thus, the court deemed that the 
IEA’s blanket prohibition on all audio recordings without the consent of 
each party swept far too broadly.178  The court noted, however, that the 
entire IEA was not completely erroneous, and that there are instances in 
which recordings of truly private conversations are within its legitimate 
scope.179 
2.  People v. Melongo 
The same day that the court handed down the decision in Clark, the 
Illinois Supreme Court dealt another blow to the IEA in People v. 
Melongo.180  Annabel Melongo was charged with several counts of 
surreptitiously recording a phone conversation between herself and a 
court reporter supervisor.181  Melongo had been charged with computer 
tampering in a case unrelated to the eavesdropping charge.182  Although 
Melongo was present on the date of arraignment for the tampering 
charge, which the official record reflected, the judge’s half sheet and the 
court call sheet indicated that Melongo was absent and that the 
arraignment did not take place.183  Subsequently, in an effort to have the 
court call sheet changed to accurately reflect that Melongo was present, 
 
176. Id. ¶ 23. 
177. Id.; see ACLU v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 595–96 (7th Cir. 2012) (“By way of a simple 
analogy, banning photography or note-taking at a public event would raise serious First 
Amendment concerns . . . .  The same is true of a ban on audio and visual recording.”). 
178. Clark, 2014 IL 115776, ¶ 22. 
179. Id.  “The prohibition on [recording private conversations] serves the purpose of the [IEA] 
to protect conversational privacy.  However, the [IEA’s] blanket ban on audio recordings sweeps 
[too] broadly . . . .”  Id. 
180. People v. Melongo, 2014 IL 114852, 6 N.E.3d 120 (Ill. 2014).  Melongo was also 
charged with three counts of divulging information obtained via use of an eavesdropping device.  
Id. ¶ 7.  This second crime, a violation of 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-2(a)(3), is a separate charge 
of eavesdropping.  Section 5/14-2(a)(3) reads: 
(a) A person commits eavesdropping when he: . . . (3) Uses or divulges, except as 
authorized by this Article or by Article 108A or 108B of the “Code of Criminal 
Procedure of 1963”, approved August 14, 1963, as amended, any information which he 
knows or reasonably should know was obtained through the use of an eavesdropping 
device. 
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-2(a)(3) (2012). 
181. Melongo, 2014 IL 114852, ¶¶ 5–7. 
182. Id. ¶ 5. 
183. Id. ¶¶ 5–6. 
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she recorded a conversation with a court reporter supervisor.184  After 
recording the conversation in which Melongo attempted, 
unsuccessfully, to persuade the supervisor to change the record, she 
posted the recordings and transcripts on her website.185  The subsequent 
posting of the recorded conversations led to three counts of using or 
divulging information obtained through the use of an eavesdropping 
device.186  In her defense, Melongo contended that her recording was 
exempt from prosecution pursuant to one of the statutory exceptions to 
the IEA—that is, the belief that the individual being recorded is 
committing or about to commit a criminal offense against the recorder 
and the recording will lead to evidence of such.187 
After a lengthy trial on the IEA charges, the jury was unable to reach 
a unanimous verdict, and a mistrial was declared.188  The matter was 
subsequently assigned to a new trial court judge.189  Melongo filed a 
pro se motion to declare the IEA unconstitutional.190  The new judge 
ruled in favor of Melongo and held the IEA unconstitutional both 
facially and in its application to Melongo.191  Upon a finding of 
 
184. Id. ¶¶ 5–7. 
185. Id. ¶ 7. 
186. Id. 
187. Melongo, 2014 IL 114852, ¶ 8.  Specifically, Melongo contended that she was acting in a 
lawful manner under a reasonable suspicion of a criminal offense exemption, 720 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. 5/14-3(i), which reads: 
Recording of a conversation made by or at the request of a person, not a law 
enforcement officer or agent of a law enforcement officer, who is a party to the 
conversation, under reasonable suspicion that another party to the conversation is 
committing, is about to commit, or has committed a criminal offense against the person 
or a member of his or her immediate household, and there is reason to believe that 
evidence of the criminal offense may be obtained by the recording. 
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-3(i) (2012) (emphasis added); see supra Part I.B.3 and note 78 
(addressing the many exceptions to the IEA). 
188. Melongo, 2014 IL 114852, ¶ 12. 
189. Id.  Initially, Melongo filed a motion to dismiss, predicated on her 5/14-3(i) defense, see 
supra note 187, in which she stipulated to the fact that she recorded the conversations with the 
court reporter supervisor.  Melongo, 2014 IL 114852, ¶ 8.  The motion was denied by the court, 
as was a subsequent motion by Melongo to reconsider.  Id. ¶ 10.  Melongo filed a third motion to 
dismiss, this time on the basis that IEA was unconstitutional “under the due process clauses of 
both the Illinois and United States Constitutions because there is ‘no rational relation between 
requiring two party consent and a legitimate state interest.’”  Id. ¶ 11.  This motion was argued 
but also denied by the court.  Id. 
190. Id. ¶ 13. 
191. The court’s order stated, “[T]he [IEA] appears to be vague, restrictive and makes 
innocent conduct subject to prosecution.”  Id. ¶ 14.  The trial judge’s order relied heavily on the 
Seventh Circuit’s ruling in ACLU v. Alvarez, which held in part that the IEA was unconstitutional 
on First Amendment grounds when applied to a plan to record police officers while performing 
their professional duties in public.  Id.; see ACLU v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 595–96 (7th Cir. 
2012); see also supra Part I.B.4 (addressing the ACLU’s challenge to the IEA in federal court). 
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unconstitutionality, the State appealed and the Illinois Supreme Court 
reviewed the question de novo.192  Ultimately, the court determined that 
the IEA was unconstitutionally overbroad, “burden[ing] substantially 
more speech than is necessary to serve a legitimate state interest in 
protecting conversational privacy.”193  The court noted that its holding 
was guided by and wholly consistent with its decision in Clark.194  
Additionally, however, the court provided several examples of the 
criminalized “innocent conduct”—including recording loud arguments 
in the street or at a large athletic event—which the court in Clark 
claimed the IEA criminalized.195  After citing several examples, the 
court stated that none implicate privacy interests, but under the current 
statutory scheme all constitute felonious behavior.196  Therefore, 
consistent with Clark, the court in Melongo reaffirmed the overbroad 
and unconstitutional nature of the IEA.197 
III.  ANALYSIS 
A.  Clark, Melongo, and Workplace Recording Policies 
There are several implications of Clark and Melongo, but this 
Comment focuses on the indirect effects on workplace recording 
policies.  As discussed in Part I.C, employers may put in place a policy 
that prohibits employees from recording in the workplace for several 
reasons.198  These might include, for example, policies to protect trade 
secrets, foster openness and collaboration, or to protect against 
 
192. Melongo, 2014 IL 114852, ¶¶ 17, 20; see People v. Kitch, 942 N.E.2d 1235, 1243 (Ill. 
2011) (“Whether a statute is constitutional is a question of law, which we review de novo.” 
(emphasis in original) (citation omitted)); see also ILL. SUP. CT. R. 603 (requiring direct appeal to 
the Illinois Supreme Court when a criminal statute is invalidated). 
193. Melongo, 2014 IL 114852, ¶ 31. 
194. “Although the cases were not consolidated, they involved similar issues . . . [and o]ur 
analysis in [Melongo] is guided by our holding in Clark.”  Id. ¶ 26.  The court also found that the 
additional claim—the criminal publishing of the recordings—which was not present in Clark to 
be unconstitutionally overbroad.  Id. ¶ 36.  “We hold that [Melongo] cannot be constitutionally 
prosecuted for divulging the contents of the conversations she recorded.”  Id.  This subsequent 
ruling by the court is likely predicated on the fact that the court determined that the initial 
recording did not constitute criminal activity. 
195. Id. ¶ 29.  “The [IEA] criminalizes the recording of conversations that cannot be deemed 
private: a loud argument on the street, a political debate on a college quad, yelling fans at an 
athletic event, or any conversation loud enough that the speakers should expect to be heard by 
others.”  Id. 
196. Id. 
197. Id. ¶¶ 26, 31. 
198. See supra Part I.C and accompanying notes (discussing the various reasons that 
employers have proffered for instituting workplace recording policies). 
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corporate espionage.199  Prior to Clark and Melongo, eavesdropping—
both surreptitiously and openly—was criminal and an employer hardly 
needed to justify discipline of an employee for committing a crime 
while at work.200 
Because Clark and Melongo are criminal cases the holdings of the 
cases alone will not address employment concerns.  Ultimately, 
although open recording is no longer criminal in Illinois, that change in 
the law does not give employees license to engage in whatever behavior 
they desire while they are at work.201  Most workplaces have rules and 
guidelines that employees are expected to follow as a condition of their 
employment.202  Typically, employees receive a handbook when they 
are hired and are instructed to read the rules and regulations, 
subsequently signing a form, which presumably confirms that the 
individual has read such rules.203  Employers tend to do this to assert 
that the employee was on notice of such rules and on notice that 
violations could subject the employee to discipline.204  When an 
employee breaches a workplace policy it is not at all uncommon for 
employers to take adverse employment action against the employee.205  
 
199. See supra Part I.C and accompanying notes. 
200. See text accompanying supra notes 10 (collecting cases of employee discharge for 
violating workplace policy) & 11 (collecting cases of employee-at-will doctrine). 
201. See text accompanying supra notes 10–11 (providing cases involving employee 
discharge for violating workplace policy). 
202. See text accompanying supra note 10 (listing cases that involve employees being 
discharged for violating workplace policy); see also supra Part I.C and accompanying notes 
(citing several examples of a promulgated workplace recording policy). 
203. See, e.g., Ethics Code of Conduct, POTBELLY CORP. 1 (Oct. 2013), 
http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/AMDA-24CMIO/0x0x688242/f922e732-f723-477f-9d84-
3b1c4fee9ec0/Potbelly_-_Ethics_Code_of_Conduct_-As_sent_to_Board.pdf (“All employees are 
required to acknowledge, upon hire and annually, that they have read, understand and are in 
compliance with this Ethics Code of Conduct.  Abiding by this Code is a condition of continued 
employment with Potbelly. . . .  Any employee who fails to meet the obligations set forth in this 
Code or the law will be subject to discipline, up to and including dismissal.”); City of Chicago 
Personnel Rules, CITY OF CHI. (Nov. 18, 2010), http://www.cityofchicago.org/content/ 
dam/city/depts/dhr/supp_info/HRpolicies/Personnel_Rules_DHR_03_2012_Choi.pdf (noting 
after most rules that employees found in violation may be subject to discipline, up to and 
including discharge). 
204. See text accompanying supra note 203 (showing examples of Potbelly’s Ethics Code of 
Conduct and the City of Chicago’s Personnel Rules which provide employees with sufficient 
notice of the rules and the consequences of violating those rules); see also Ethical Business 
Conduct Guidelines, BOEING 9, http://www.boeing.com/assets/pdf/companyoffices/aboutus/ 
ethics/ethics_booklet.pdf (last visited Apr. 26, 2015) (“All employees, including contract labor 
employees, sign a document stating they will adhere to the Boeing Code of Conduct and uphold 
the values set forth for the company.  This action allows each of us to acknowledge our ethical 
expectations and reminds us of our responsibility to uphold integrity . . . .”). 
205. See text accompanying supra note 10 (collecting cases of employee discharge for 
violating workplace policy); see also Thorne v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc., 410 F. App’x 994, 996–
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A violation of certain policies, rules, or particularly egregious behavior, 
can result in termination of the employee.206  Additionally, Clark and 
Melongo do not alter the age-old tradition of at-will employment.207  An 
at-will employee may be fired for any reason, or no reason at all, so 
long as the termination is non-discriminatory.208  Whether the employee 
is at-will or otherwise, an employer may never justify termination on 
the basis of discrimination.209  When an employee breaches workplace 
policy, however, termination is certainly warranted.210  Therefore, 
although open recording of conversations is no longer a criminal act in 
Illinois, employers may still prohibit their employees from engaging in 
such behavior in the workplace based on their own employment policy. 
B.  Be Wary of Pretext: What Employers Cannot Prohibit 
Although a violation of workplace policy is something that can 
warrant termination, employers should take great caution that they do 
not terminate an employee who was engaging in a statutorily protected 
activity.211  Recall the discussion of Title VII and the issue of 
pretext.212  Employers cannot fire employees for opposing 
discrimination or retaliation, which Title VII declares are protected 
activities.213  This concept becomes more complicated, however, when 
an employee may be attempting to procure evidence of discrimination 
by means of recording conversations or actions of supervisors or other 
employees.214 
 
97 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding that an employer’s decision to fire employee for violations of its 
workplace policies was not pretext for discrimination); Bradford v. City of Chi., 121 F. App’x 
137, 140 (7th Cir. 2005) (finding legitimate the city’s decision to place its bipolar employee on 
suspension for violating a zero-tolerance workplace-violence policy). 
206. See text accompanying supra notes 10 (collecting cases of employee discharge for 
violating workplace policy), 101 (examples of employees discharged for recording 
conversations), & 205 (collecting Seventh Circuit cases of employee discharge for violating 
workplace policy). 
207. See text accompanying supra note 11 (collecting cases of employee-at-will doctrine). 
208. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a) (2012); see text accompanying supra note 11. 
209. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a); see generally McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 
(1973) (establishing the standard test for discriminatory employment action); Ginsburg, supra 
note 138, at 353 (stating that of all federal measures implemented to eliminate employment 
discrimination, Title VII has the greatest impact). 
210. See text accompanying supra note 10. 
211. If an employer terminates an employee for engaging in a statutorily defined protected 
activity, the employer is liable under Title VII.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a); see supra Part II.B. 
212. See supra Part II.B. 
213. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a). 
214. See, e.g., Stephens Media, LLC, 356 N.L.R.B. No. 63 (Feb. 14, 2011) (lending support to 
the proposition that an employer may ban employees from recording; however, in this case the 
employer promulgated the policy after it discovered employees attempting to gain evidence of 
discrimination—a protected activity under Title VII—and therefore found against the employer); 
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Pursuant to the opposition clause, an employer cannot discipline an 
employee for opposing discriminatory treatment215 or attempting to 
collect evidence of such treatment.216  So long as the employer 
specifically disciplines the employee for a violation of a workplace 
recording policy, however, the employer should be able to withstand 
any claim that the discipline was a pretextual reason for otherwise 
terminating the employee for opposing discrimination.217  When 
addressing instances such as the one mentioned above, Illinois courts 
should take guidance from the Sixth and Seventh Circuits’ reasoning in 
determining whether employee recording under the guise of “opposing 
discrimination” legitimately overcomes the adverse employment action. 
The Seventh Circuit addressed this question in Argyropoulos and 
provided persuasive reasoning, which Illinois courts may adopt when 
confronting this issue.218  Recall that Argyropoulos, a jailor for the 
Alton Police Department, was discharged when it was discovered that 
she surreptitiously tape-recorded a workplace meeting with two of her 
supervisors.219  The court in Argyropoulos noted that when determining 
the legitimacy of an adverse employment action, the length of time that 
elapsed between the protected activity and the adverse action is 
critical.220  In that case, seven weeks had elapsed since the complained-
of sexual harassment and Argyropoulos’ termination; as opposed to a 
 
Bast, supra note 6, at 849–51 (discussing an instance where Texaco employees taped information 
to prove employment discrimination claims causing a suit to go on for two and one-half years 
before a settlement was reached). 
215. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a); Jones v. St. Jude Med. S.C., Inc., 504 F. App’x 473, 480 (6th 
Cir. 2012); Argyropoulos v. City of Alton, 539 F.3d 724, 732 (7th Cir. 2008). 
216. While collecting evidence is protected under Title VII, what constitutes protected 
collection is a decision made by the courts.  See Jones, 504 F. App’x at 480–81 (holding that 
while an employee may claim protection for activities that were opposing the alleged 
discrimination, a violation of the employer’s recording policy was not necessary in order to do 
so).  In determining whether an activity constitutes opposing discrimination, the Sixth Circuit has 
stated that the employee’s action must be reasonable.  Id. at 480; see Johnson v. Univ. of 
Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561, 580 (6th Cir. 2000) (“In short, the only qualification that is placed upon 
an employee’s invocation of protection from retaliation under Title VII’s opposition clause is that 
the manner of his opposition must be reasonable.”). 
217. Jones, 504 F. App’x at 481; Argyropoulos, 539 F.3d at 737–38.  See generally text 
accompanying note 10 (collecting cases of employee discharge for violating workplace policy). 
218. See supra Part II.A and accompanying notes (analyzing Argyropoulos). 
219. Argyropoulos, 539 F.3d at 727.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a) does not insulate an employee 
that engages in workplace espionage and dubious self-help tactics from discipline.  Argyropoulos, 
539 F.3d at 733–34; cf. Nasir Gore et al., supra note 99.  Although developed after the Seventh 
Circuit’s decision in Argyropoulos, Google Glass presents an employee with the opportunity to 
engage in exactly the type dubious behavior the court holds Title VII does not protect.  Nasir 
Gore et al., supra note 99. 
220. Argyropoulos, 539 F.3d at 736. 
GIBSON PRINT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/27/2015  2:45 PM 
2015] Just Because It’s Legal Doesn’t Mean You Can Do It 945 
mere two days after the discovery of the recording violation.221  Thus, 
the court stated that it would not second-guess an employer’s “facially 
legitimate business decision.”222 
It is important to note that at the time that Agyropoulos was decided, 
surreptitious eavesdropping constituted a crime in Illinois.223  
Additionally, under the December changes to the IEA, surreptitious 
recording of a private conversation is still illegal.224  Stringing these 
two propositions together, it is logical to infer that so long as there is 
nothing suspicious about the timing, and the employer proffers a 
legitimate reason for the adverse employment action, the employer will 
likely withstand a Title VII allegation.225  This result does not turn 
alone on whether the jurisdiction has a two-party consent eavesdropping 
law.226  A similar judgment was rendered on the issue by the Sixth 
Circuit’s decision in Jones, which interpreted Ohio’s one-party consent 
statute.227 
Similar to the argument in Argyropoulos, Jones asserted that she was 
unlawfully terminated for engaging in protected activities under Title 
VII.228  However, Jones went one step further and alleged that 
regardless of the employer’s recording policy, a violation could not 
have provided a legitimate basis for termination because the recordings 
were a protected activity under Title VII—namely, opposing retaliation 
by collecting evidence of the conduct via the recordings.229  The court 
 
221. Id. 
222. Id. 
223. The Seventh Circuit decided Argyropoulos in 2008, whereas the Illinois Supreme Court 
decided Clark and Melongo—invalidating the open recording portion of the IEA—in March 
2014. 
224. See infra Part IV.A (explaining the December changes to the IEA). 
225. See Argyropoulos, 539 F.3d at 736 (ruling that “even if Argyropoulos had managed to 
establish the prima facie case, her retaliation claim would still face an insurmountable obstacle, 
because she cannot show that the City’s proffered justification for her arrest and termination was 
a pretext for retaliation”); see also Jones v. St. Jude Med. S.C., Inc., 504 F. App’x 473, 477–79 
(6th Cir. 2012) (“When an employer offers more than one independent, legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for an adverse employment action, even if one is found to be pretextual but 
at least one other is not, the defendant employer is still entitled to summary judgment.”); text 
accompanying supra note 205 (collecting Seventh Circuit cases of employee discharge for 
violating workplace policy). 
226. See Jones, 504 F. App’x at 480 (describing Jones’ secret recording of conversations). 
227. See supra Part II.C (analyzing Jones). 
228. Jones, 504 F. App’x at 473. 
229. Id. at 479; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a) (2012) (“It shall be an unlawful employment 
practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for 
employment . . . because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by 
this subchapter . . . .”).  The court noted that “[o]nly the opposition clause applies in Jones’s case 
because she made many of the recordings well before she first filed a discrimination complaint 
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission . . . .”  Jones, 504 F. App’x at 480. 
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found that Jones failed to produce any evidence rebutting the reason for 
her termination.230  Moreover, Jones failed to assert why a violation of 
company policy was not a legitimate reason for her termination.231  
Thus, she effectively conceded that the adverse action taken against her 
was legitimate.232  The court took time to note that it was unaware why 
Jones needed to violate company policy at all to oppose the alleged 
improprieties.233  The court reasoned that there are many other means to 
accomplish the same end that do not violate the employer’s workplace 
recording policy.234 
Although the court in Jones interpreted a one-party consent 
eavesdropping law, it came to the same conclusion as the Seventh 
Circuit in Argyropoulos, which interpreted a two-party consent law.235  
Clearly, the determinative issue was not whether the state in which the 
adverse employment action occurred was a one-party or two-party 
consent eavesdropping jurisdiction.236  Rather, the legality of the 
employee’s discharge turned on whether the employer had a legitimate 
reason—e.g., violation of a company workplace recording policy.237 
IV.  PROPOSAL 
A.  A Lasting Act 
On December 30, 2014, as one of his last official acts as the 
Governor of Illinois, Pat Quinn signed into law Senate Bill 1342, which 
amended and reinstituted a criminal eavesdropping law in the state.238  
The new rules redefine eavesdropping, essentially harmonizing the IEA 
with Clark and Melongo.  Specifically, after the passage of the 
amendment, in order for an individual to commit criminal 
 
230. Jones, 504 F. App’x at 480. 
231. Id. 
232. Id. 
233. Id. at 481. 
234. Id. 
235. See id. at 480 (describing Jones’s secret recording of conversations); text accompanying 
supra note 142 (describing Ohio’s eavesdropping law).  See generally Argyropoulos v. City of 
Alton, 539 F.3d 724, 737–38 (7th Cir. 2008); supra Part I.B.3 (citing the version of the IEA prior 
to Clark and Melongo). 
236. Both the Argyropoulos court and the Jones court came to the same conclusion while the 
former was interpreting a two-party consent law and the latter was interpreting a one-party 
consent law.  Jones, 594 F. App’x at 480; Argyropoulos, 539 F.3d at 737–38. 
237. Jones, 594 F. App’x at 480; Argyropoulos, 539 F.3d at 737–38. 
238. Monique Garcia, Quinn Signs New Illinois Eavesdropping Rules into Law, CHI. TRIB. 
(Dec. 30, 2014, 5:53 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-quinn-signs-illinois-eavesdr 
opping-law-met-1231-20141230-story.html; Patricia Whitten et al., Governor Quinn Signs New 
Eavesdropping Law, FRANCZEK RADELET (Jan. 6, 2015), http://www.franczek.com/frontcenter-
Quinn_Eavesdropping_Law_Signed.html. 
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eavesdropping, an individual must surreptitiously record a private 
conversation.239  The culpable mens rea of the IEA, knowingly or 
intentionally, stayed the same, presently: 
(a) A person commits eavesdropping when he or she knowingly and 
intentionally: (1) Uses an eavesdropping device, in a surreptitious 
manner, for the purpose of overhearing, transmitting, or recording all 
or any part of any private conversation to which he or she is not a 
party unless he or she does so with the consent of all of the parties to 
the private conversation . . . .240 
There are two significant changes that the Illinois General Assembly 
made to the IEA.  First, the General Assembly added that the recorder 
of a conversation must do so in a surreptitious, or secretive, manner,241 
raising the inference that if done in the open it would give the recorded 
party (or parties) notice.242  The second change consisted of redefining a 
conversation; specifically, the IEA now protects only private 
conversations.243  In Section 5/14-1(d), the Ninety-Eighth General 
Assembly substituted “private conversation” for “conversation,” 
including a reasonable expectation of privacy by one of the parties: 
(d) Private conversation. 
For the purposes of this Article, “private conversation” means any 
oral communication between 2 or more persons, whether in person or 
transmitted between the parties by wire or other means, when one or 
more of the parties intended the communication to be of a private 
nature under circumstances reasonably justifying that expectation.244 
 
239. S.B. 1342, 98th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., 2014 Ill. Laws, P.A. 98-1142, § 5. 
240. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/14-2(a)(1) (West 2014) (emphasis added).  Compare the 
present version of the statute with the older version: 
(a) A person commits eavesdropping when he: (1) Knowingly and intentionally uses an 
eavesdropping device for the purpose of hearing or recording all or any part of any 
conversation or intercepts, retains, or transcribes electronic communication unless he 
does so (A) with the consent of all of the parties to such conversation or electronic 
communication . . . . 
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-2(a)(1) (2012). 
241. S.B. 1342, 98th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., 2014 Ill. Laws, P.A. 98-1142, § 5. 
242. Cf. People v. Clark, 2014 IL 115776, ¶ 20, 6 N.E.3d 154, 160 (Ill. 2014) (“[N]o 
recording could be made absent consent from all parties regardless of any lack of expectation of 
privacy.”); People v. Beardsley, 503 N.E.2d 346, 349 (Ill. 1986) (“[I]f the parties to a 
conversation act under circumstances which entitle them to believe that the conversation is 
private and cannot be heard by others who are acting in a lawful manner, then they should be 
protected in their privacy.”). 
243. S.B. 1342, 98th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., 2014 Ill. Laws, P.A. 98-1142, § 5; see 
Whitten et al., supra note 238. 
244. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/14-1(d) (West 2014) (emphasis added).  Compare the 
present version of the statute with the older version: 
[T]he term conversation means any oral communication between 2 or more persons 
regardless of whether one or more of the parties intended their communication to be of 
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Both changes bring the IEA back within the permissible scope 
authorized by the Illinois Supreme Court in Clark and Melongo.245  
Clark and Melongo’s stated reason for the IEA’s unconstitutionality was 
that it swept too broadly.246  The court noted, however, that truly private 
conversations would be within the permissible scope of a state 
eavesdropping law.247  Thus, consistent with the State’s desire to 
protect conversational privacy, it appears that the General Assembly 
determined that a two-party consent law more aptly addressed those 
concerns.248 
B.  Court Reactions to the December Changes to the 
Illinois Eavesdropping Act 
 With the changes to the IEA now codified into law, individuals can 
once again be charged with criminal eavesdropping in Illinois.  This 
raises several questions: How should courts react to the changes made, 
in the criminal context, generally?  Should the law be upheld as 
constitutional?  What constitutes a reasonable expectation of privacy?  
This Part analyzes these questions through the lenses of both the 
Seventh Circuit courts and Illinois state courts. 
1.  Federal Court Reaction  
 The December changes to IEA are consistent with the majority’s 
reasoning in American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois v. Alvarez.249  
The primary concern of the majority was that the draconian IEA was 
criminalizing conversations that took place in open, public places, 
creating too great a restriction on speech.250  The conversations at issue 
 
a private nature under circumstances justifying that expectation. 
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-1(d) (2012). 
245. See Whitten et al., supra note 238. 
246. Clark, 2014 IL 115776, ¶ 23; People v. Melongo, 2014 IL 114852, ¶ 29, 6 N.E.3d 120 
(Ill. 2014). 
247. Clark, 2014 IL 115776, ¶ 22 (“Audio recordings of truly private conversations are within 
the legitimate scope of the [IEA].”).  See generally Melongo, 2014 IL 114852, ¶¶ 17, 20, 31. 
248. See ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 12 (Right to Remedy and Justice: “Every person shall find a 
certain remedy in the laws for all injuries and wrongs which he receives to his person, privacy, 
property or reputation.  He shall obtain justice by law, freely, completely, and promptly.”); Clark, 
2014 IL 115776, ¶ 22 (stating that prohibiting truly private conversations would serve the IEA’s 
statutory purpose of protecting conversational privacy); Melongo, 2014 IL 114852, ¶ 28 (“The 
State and defendant agree that the purpose of the [IEA] is to protect conversational privacy.”); 
Beardsley, 503 N.E.2d at 349 (“The reason for this [eavesdropping] legislation has, of course, 
been to protect the privacy of the individual.”). 
249. Compare ACLU v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 595–600 (7th Cir. 2012), with S.B. 1342, 98th 
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., 2014 Ill. Laws, P.A. 98-1142, § 5, and 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 
5/14-1–2 (West 2014). 
250. Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 600. 
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in Alvarez implicated no elements of privacy, and thus, the majority 
stated criminalizing their recording did not serve the important 
governmental interest in protecting conversational privacy.251  
Specifically, under the IEA’s broad scope, the statute’s means did not 
meet its ends.252 
 Although the Alvarez decision only called into question the validity 
of the IEA,253 making no final constitutional judgment, the majority 
would likely uphold the statute under the December changes to the 
IEA.254  In fact, the majority implied that protecting personal privacy is 
an important goal.255  Therefore, under the new scope of the IEA—
criminalizing only the secret recording of a private conversation—
Seventh Circuit federal courts addressing the issue should rule favorably 
on the IEA’s constitutionality. 
2.  Illinois State Court Reaction 
When Illinois courts are confronted with an individual charged with 
criminal eavesdropping, the constitutionality of the December changes 
to the IEA should go unquestioned.  By striking the offending language 
in the definition of a conversation, “regardless of whether one or more 
of the parties intended their communication to be of a private nature 
under circumstances justifying that expectation,”256 the December 
changes to the IEA are consistent with the Illinois Supreme Court’s 
decisions in Clark and Melongo.257  Clark and Melongo only held that 
the IEA was unconstitutionally overbroad in criminalizing what the 
court deemed to be “otherwise innocent conduct.”258  The court was 
explicit that the problem with the IEA was that it criminalized the 
recording of conversations in which the conversants had no reasonable 
expectation of privacy.259  Moreover, the court also stated that “[a]udio 
recordings of truly private conversations are within the legitimate scope 
 
251. Id. at 608. 
252. Id. at 606. 
253. Id. at 608. 
254. See generally id. 
255. Id. at 606. 
256. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-1(d) (2012). 
257. People v. Clark, 2014 IL 115776, ¶ 21, 6 N.E.3d 154 (Ill. 2014) (“Individuals have a 
valid interest in the privacy of their communications and a legitimate expectation that their 
private conversations will not be recorded by those not privy to the conversation.”); People v. 
Melongo, 2014 IL 114852, ¶ 28, 6 N.E.3d 120 (Ill. 2014) (“[T]he purpose of the statute is to 
protect conversational privacy.”). 
258. Clark, 2014 IL 115776, ¶¶ 22, 23; see Melongo, 2014 IL 114852, ¶ 29 (“The [IEA] 
criminalizes the recording of conversation that cannot be deemed private . . . .”). 
259. Clark, 2014 IL 115776, ¶¶ 21; Melongo, 2014 IL 114852, ¶ 29. 
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of the [IEA].”260  Thus, the constitutionality of the IEA should go 
unchallenged since Clark and Melongo had their intended effect: 
reigning in the scope of IEA. 
The next logical question courts must address is what constitutes a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.261  People v. Beardsley, the first case 
in which the Illinois Supreme Court mentioned that an expectation of 
privacy is necessary to criminalize recording, may provide guidance.262  
In Beardsley, the court agreed that the purpose of the IEA was to protect 
from recording what was said in private.263  In that case, the court 
dismissed the eavesdropping charges against Beardsley because the 
police officers he recorded did not have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.264  Thus, at the very least, we can infer that an individual can 
record police officers performing their official duties without any 
reasonable expectation of privacy present.265 
The support found in Illinois jurisprudence for the aforementioned 
conception of a reasonable expectation of privacy notwithstanding,266 in 
the wake of recent police shootings of unarmed civilians, there may be a 
more basic public desire for the transparency that comes with 
recording.267  Consider, for example the video evidence of a New York 
City Police Officer choking Eric Garner, a forty-three-year-old Staten 
 
260. Clark, 2014 IL 115776, ¶ 22. 
261. The IEA is silent on what constitutes a reasonable expectation of privacy.  See 720 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/14-1 (West 2014). 
262. People v. Beardsley, 503 N.E.2d 346, 349 (Ill. 1986) (“We agree with the defendant that 
the [IEA] was intended to protect individuals from the surreptitious monitoring of their 
conversations by the use of eavesdropping devices . . . .”); see Claiborne, supra note 43, at 492 
(stating that the IEA included an element of reasonable expectation of privacy, although at the 
time Beardsley was decided, the statute did not explicitly include such a condition). 
263. Beardsley, 503 N.E.2d at 349.  The court mentions that the General Assembly 
Committee Comments of the IEA state that the reason for the legislation was to “protect the 
privacy of the individual.”  Id. 
264. Id. at 349. 
265. Accord id.  Moreover, in Clark, the court explicitly invoked the rule of Beardsley, stating 
that “consent of all the parties to a conversation to the recording of that conversation [is] not 
required in instances where any party lack[s] an intent to keep the conversation private.”  Clark, 
2014 IL 115776, ¶ 20. 
266. Cf. ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 12; Clark, 2014 IL 115776, ¶ 22; People v. Melongo, 2014 IL 
114852, ¶ 28, 6 N.E.3d 120 (Ill. 2014); Beardsley, 503 N.E.2d at 349. 
267. See, e.g., Peter Herman & Rachel Weiner, Turning to Tech to Restore Trust, WASH. 
POST, Dec. 3, 2014, at A1, A16 (addressing the debate over police officer body cameras after the 
tragic shooting of a black youth by a white police officer in the summer of 2014); Fiona Ortiz, 
Police Chiefs Pledge More Transparency After Ferguson, REUTERS (Sept. 17, 2014, 6:39 PM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/17/us-usa-police-transparency-idUSKBN0HC2IC201409 
17 (reporting that in wake of Ferguson police chiefs plan to implement more transparency in 
policing). 
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Island man, to death for selling cigarettes when he “resisted” arrest.268  
If the bystander who recorded this interaction did so in Illinois, under 
the old IEA the individual would have committed felony 
eavesdropping.269  However, in the wake of the December changes to 
the IEA the same recording likely does not implicate any reasonable 
expectation of privacy and would not be criminal.270 
C.  So What?  How the December Changes to the 
Illinois Eavesdropping Act Will Affect Employee 
Recording in the Workplace 
1.  If an Employee Records a Conversation at Work, 
Does it Constitute a Crime? 
 Under the December changes to the IEA, an individual commits 
criminal eavesdropping when he or she surreptitiously records a private 
conversation.271  Determining whether an employee has a reasonable 
expectation to privacy is fact specific and would likely change 
dependent on the location of the employee—i.e., when in the main 
office juxtaposed to when the employee is in a supervisor’s or 
coworker’s office discussing a matter deemed sensitive.272  This raises 
an interesting question about whether an employer has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in its workplace, which merits mention, though it 
is outside the scope of this Comment.273  Thus, it is unclear whether 
 
268. Joseph Goldstein & Nate Schweber, Man’s Death After Chokehold Raises Old Issue for 
Police, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2014, at A1.  For more information on the failure of a New York 
grand jury to indict the police officer who choked Garner to death, see Christopher Mathias & 
Lilly Workneh, Grand Jury Declines to Indict NYPD Officer in Chokehold Death of Eric Garner, 
HUFF. POST (Dec. 12, 2014, 11:59 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/12/03/eric-
garner_n_6263656.html. 
269. See supra Part I.B.3 (discussing the IEA prior to Clark and Melongo). 
270. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/14-1 (West 2014); cf. ACLU v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 
606 (7th Cir. 2012); Beardsley, 503 N.E.2d at 349. 
271. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/14-2 (West 2014). 
272. Scott McNealy, Sun Microsystems CEO believes that the battle for employee privacy in 
the workplace was over before it even started.  See A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?, 
52 STAN. L. REV. 1461, 1462 (2000) (quoting Mr. McNealy saying “You have zero privacy 
anyway. . . .  Get over it.”).  McNealy, who is a member of a privacy watchdog group the Online 
Privacy Alliance, told reporters that consumer privacy was a “red herring.”  Peter D. Jacobsen, 
Medical Records and HIPPA: Is it Too Late To Protect Privacy?, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1497, 1497 
(2002) (citation omitted). 
273. There are many articles and discussion about employer monitoring of employees and 
employees’ right to—or the need to ensure—privacy in the workplace.  See, e.g., Corey A. 
Ciochetti, The Eavesdropping Employer: A Twenty-First Century Framework for Employee 
Monitoring, 48 AM. BUS. L.J. 285 (2011) (advocating for a new framework for technological 
monitoring that balances the techniques of privacy invasiveness with enterprise protection); 
Ariana R. Levinson, Carpe Diem: Privacy in Employment Act, 43 AKRON L. REV. 331 (2010) 
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criminal liability would be triggered under the IEA if an employee 
secretly records a conversation at work.  What is clear from the changes 
made to the IEA, however, is that if an employee openly records a 
conversation at work, it would not trigger criminal liability.  Pursuant to 
the December changes to the IEA, open recording would negate any 
reasonable expectation of privacy that a party to the conversation could 
perceive.274 
2.  Employer Handbook Has a Specific 
Policy Addressing Workplace Recording 
Regardless of whether an employee commits criminal eavesdropping, 
it should not affect whether or not an employer can prohibit its 
employees from recording while at work.  When the Seventh Circuit 
decided Argyropoulos under the old IEA, the court never addressed 
expectations of privacy and barely scratched the surface of a criminality 
discussion.275  It appears the court viewed both these elements as 
irrelevant.276  The violation of company policy alone was an egregious 
act, one that the court determined sufficiently warranted the adverse 
employment action.277  The Argyropoulos court repeatedly emphasized 
that inappropriate workplace activities are not legitimate and that even 
prior complaints of harassment or discrimination do not immunize an 
employee from being disciplined for subsequent inappropriate 
workplace behavior.278 
 Analysis of this issue brings the reader back to same proposition: just 
because an act is not illegal does not mean that you can do it while at 
work.  Although it is not illegal to record a conversation that lacks an 
 
(proposing that legislation be enacted to protect the privacy of employees from technological 
monitoring by employers at work); Mehta, supra note 99, at 611 (specifically discussing the 
implications of Google Glass, “Balancing measures must be implemented to ensure the protection 
of an employer’s business strategies and confidential information as well as an employee’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy when using personal devices, like Google Glass, in the 
workplace”).  The answer as to whether an employer has a reasonable expectation of privacy, 
however, is less clear and outside the scope of this Comment. 
274. Accord Whitten et al., supra note 238. 
275. Argyropoulos v. City of Alton, 539 F.3d 724, 734–37 (7th Cir. 2008); see supra Part 
I.B.3 (providing the version of the IEA held unconstitutional by Clark and Melongo). 
276. The Argyropoulos court stated that even if Argyropoulos could have asserted a colorable 
defense to the eavesdropping charge, “[m]erely showing that she might have been able to raise a 
meritorious defense to the eavesdropping charge is hardly tantamount to showing of bad faith.”  
Argryopoulos, 539 F.3d at 737. 
277. Id. at 736; see supra Part I.C and accompanying notes (addressing the consequences for 
failure to follow workplace policy); text accompanying supra note 10 (collecting cases of 
employee discharge for violating workplace policy). 
278. Argryopoulos, 539 F.3d at 734, 736–37, 741. 
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expectation of privacy,279 an employer may still discipline its 
employees for a violation of workplace policy regardless of whether the 
employee is or is not breaking the law by recording conversations.280  
Therefore, an employer should still be able to ban and discipline for 
workplace recording.  Employees are often disciplined and terminated 
for violations of company policy.281  The prohibition of an otherwise 
legal act should not immunize an employee from adverse employment 
action.282 
3.  What if the Employer Handbook is Silent 
on Workplace Recordings? 
One last issue to address is what happens if an employee openly 
records a conversation, but the employer has no workplace recording 
policy prohibiting such conduct.  Can the employer discipline or 
discharge the employee?  Should an Illinois court view such conduct 
favorably?  It is the belief of this author that the employer would still be 
justified in its discipline or discharge of an employee even absent a 
specific policy forbidding such conduct.  In particular, if the employee 
was at-will, then the employer would not need any reason for the 
discharge, and therefore, be warranted in such action.283   
The questions become more complicated, however, if the employee is 
not at-will and the handbook is silent of any sort of workplace recording 
policy.  Based on the information presented in this Comment, it is the 
belief of this author that an employer would still be merited in the 
discipline or discharge of an employee for recording at work.  Whether 
prefaced on the need to ensure an open workplace,284 protect against 
corporate espionage,285 or simply disloyalty to the company,286 an 
employer would likely be justified in such an action.  Thus, when 
reviewing such adverse employment actions, Illinois courts should view 
the policy favorably and uphold the employer’s facially legitimate 
 
279. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/14-1 to 5/14-2 (West 2014); see S.B. 1342, 98th Gen. 
Assemb., Reg. Sess., 2014 Ill. Laws, P.A. 98-1142, § 5. 
280. See supra Part I.C (addressing the consequences for failure to follow workplace policy). 
281. See id. 
282. See id.; text accompanying supra note 10 (collecting cases of employee discharge for 
violating workplace policy); cf. Jones v. St. Jude Med. S.C., Inc., 504 F. App’x 473, 481 (6th Cir. 
2012). 
283. See text accompanying supra note 11 (collecting cases of employee-at-will doctrine). 
284. See, e.g., Whole Foods Market, Inc., 1518 N.L.R.B. No. 01-CA-096965, 2013 WL 
5838721 (Div. of Judges Oct. 30, 2013). 
285. See, e.g., Nasir Gore et al., supra note 99. 
286. Cf. Heller v. Champion Int’l Corp., 891 F.2d 432, 436 (2d Cir. 1989) (noting that 
surreptitious recording represents disloyalty toward ones employer). 
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decision.  In order to fully examine and answer these questions, 
however, further scholarship on the topic is necessary. 
CONCLUSION 
People v. Clark, People v. Melongo, and the December changes to 
the IEA, implicate not only criminal law, but, indirectly, implicate 
employment law as well.  Currently, eavesdropping is illegal in Illinois 
only if an individual surreptitiously records a private conversation.  
Thus, if an employee openly records a conversation at work, one that is 
not private—implicating no reasonable expectation of privacy—no 
criminal act has occurred.  This begs the question of whether an 
employer can implement a workplace recording policy and discipline 
employees for subsequent violations thereof.  Just because something is 
legal, it does not mean that an employee has the right to engage in such 
conduct while at work.  Employees are discharged frequently for 
workplace policy violations, even those policies that implicate no 
criminal conduct.  Seventh Circuit federal courts and Illinois state courts 
that are confronted with such policies and subsequent discipline should 
view the actions favorably and uphold employer-recording policies. 
Currently, Clark, Melongo, and the December changes to the IEA 
notwithstanding, an employer in Illinois may implement a workplace 
recording policy barring employees from recording while at work, and 
discipline an employee if he or she violates that policy. 
